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INTRODUCTION
Predatory animals, particularly coyotes, are an important
concern of the livestock industry in the Western and Southwestern
United States.

Each year livestock losses to predators run into the

millions of dollars, as do expenditures aimed at preventing these
losses.
Although prédation

the larger carnivores has long troubled

man, no predator control problem has churned up more human emotions,
aroused more political furor, and denanded more unwarranted expenditures
than the one Involving predators that prey on domestic livestock (McCabe
and Kozlcky, 1972).
For the past three decades an emotional confrontation has
developed between livestock producers and segments of the general
public.

The central point in contention is whether or not poisons

should be allowed for use in predator control operations; however,
other issues are also Involved. From the beginning of the controversy
lack of adequate Information has prevented a final solution, while
emotional claims and counterclaims by the opposing groups have further
clouded the issues.
Governmental predator control programs exist primarily for the
protection of the western sheep Industry. The coyote (CanlW latrans)
is the number one target of control operations and the arch enemy of
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domestic sheep. Complaints of coyotes attacking calves have Increased
in recent years, although prédation on cattle is probably not a serious
problem In most areas (Pitch, 1948).
Efforts to control the coyote's prédation on sheep and other
livestock began during the mid-nineteenth century. Since then, coyotes
have been killed by the millions. However, even in the faice of
advancing civilization and man's efforts at eradication, the resilient
coyote has adapted to human proximity and Increased its range (USDI,
1973).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the various issues
involved in the predator control controversy, review recent research,
and offer possible solutions to present conflicts.

The paper will be

primarily concerned with the relationships between coyotes and
domestic sheep, although many of the principles discussed will be
applicable to other predators and livestock as well.

CHAPTER II
THE ISSUES OF PREDATOR CONTROL
The prospect of attempting a rational discourse on the coyote
management controversy Is somewhat uimervlng. The ambiguous role of
coyotes within natural schemes Is frustrating to interpret in Itself.
When coupled with our inadequate knowledge of the biology, behavior,
and ecology of the beasts, and economic liabilities of one segment of
society and charismatic endearment to another, it becomes perturbing.
?y adding the political uncertainty of who should have the respons
ibility for managing, and at the same time changing the ground rules
so that no one really wants it, the situation is ripe with confusion
(Knowlton, 1973)*
The above statement is an accurate, although brief, summary of
the m^jor elements Involved in the current controversy over predator
control. The complexity of the issue is almost beyond comprehension
because it touches tqpon such a wide variety of disciplines, all of
them interrelated. It is the variety of components in the coyote
management problem that forms the basis for the existing confusion.
Human emotions have polarized opinions of the opposing groups and it
is questionable whether any middle ground can ever be found.
Regarding the coyote management controversy, the line of div
ision between the opposing factions is not always clearly defined.
There are points of disagreement between organizations and even within
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organizations. However, one can separate the opposing groups according
to broad beliefs. Generally speaking, livestock producers and In
dustries connected with livestock production favor intensified predator
control efforts and reinstatement of toxicant use. Representatives of
these viewpoints include the National Wool Growers Association,
National Cattleman's Association, American Meat Institute, comparable
State organizations, and individual stock producers.
Taking the opposite side In the controversy (usually favoring
reduced coyote control, more selective control, or at the extreme, no
control) are the groups which might be collectively labeled ais
conservationists, environmentalists, or preservationists. Siding with
these Is a considerable portion of the public at large who find the
coyotes to be of aesthetic value. This group of people is partially
represented by the following organizations on the state and national
levels#

Sierra Club, National Audobon Society, Defenders of Wildlife,

Friends of the Earth, and the National Wildlife Federation,
Solutions to the coyote management problem would become simpler
were it not for the fact that there is so much variety in the points of
interest involved.

Urban people are interested in the aesthetics of

coyotes, ecologlsts in the ecology of coyotes, economists in the
expenditures and savings Involved, and stockmen in the eradication of
the coyote. %e various points In contention are so numerous that
there is even disagreement as to which are more important and need to
be resolved first, and which are unimportant.
At this point, I will enumerate the issues and side issues which
I consider to be the most imqwrtant in the coyote (predator) control
controversy.
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Administration of the Control Program
It is fair to say that the majority of the groups on "both sides
believe that a coyote control program of some type is necessary in the
West, Given this, the question of who should administer the program
is raised. Since 1939» the Federal Government, United States
Department of the Interior has been responsible for overall admin
istration, supplying the manpower, and providing cooperative funds
and research capability. The individual States have supplied coop
erative funds, some manpower, and some research into the program.
Legislation currently before Congress would transfer responsibility
for predator contzrol activities to the individual States, The pro
posed legislation provides for Federal funding for the States to conduct
control activities now being done by the Pish and Wildlife Service,
The total State funding would derive from a combination of Federal
funds and funds contributed from the user Interest (sheep, cattle, and
other livestock producers), and responsibility of administration would
fall to individual Fish and Game Departments, Livestock Departments,
or Agriculture Departments, Under this plan the Federal Government
would still supply the major research efforts needed, provide
supervision, and enforce the program.
The idea of transfer of control responsibility to the States is
not a new one.

This viewpoint has been shared by the Department of the

Interior (Reed, 1973)» (Berryman, 1973), and(McCabe and Kozicl^, 1972),
among others,

Cain et al. (l97l), Howard (1974), and other people

involved with predator control have taken the opposite viewpoint and
believe that control activities should remain the province of the
Federal Government,
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As a sidelight, Howard (197^) has raised the point that predator
control activities do not belong in the Department of the Interior at
all because this department also has the responsibility of protecting
the country's wildlife resources. Instead, Howard suggests that
predator control should be transferred back to the Department of
Agriculture»

The responsibility for control iax»grams, originally

delegated to the Department of Agriculture, was transferred to the
Department of the Interior under the Federal reorganization in 1939
because it was felt that all wildlife management functions belonged in
the same department. Howard maintains that predator danpge control
belongs in the Department of Agriculture along with insect damage
control and weed control.
Use of Toxicants for Predator Control
One of the major points of disagreement, if not the major point,
centers upon toxicant use in predator control programs.
Since the Presidential ban on toxicant use in 1972, livestock
producers and especially wool growers, have consistently complained of
increased stock losses to coyotes. They attribute these increased
losses directly to the fact that poisons are no longer available for use
in controlling coyotes. Ranchers feel that poisons should be allowed
until more acceptable alternative controls are available. In addition,
the ranchers point out that use of poisons is more economical than
trapping, or other means of control, because bait placement is easy
and baits do not have to be tended.
Opponents of the stockmen feel that the dangers involved in
poison use far outweigh aiqr benefits to the livestock industry.
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Conservation groups argue that adequate protection can be given to
livestock by mechanical control methods and that the ramchers* claims
of Increased losses never have been substantiated. They also feel that
poisons are generally Inhumane and non selective wildlife killers. In
regard to selectivity, opponents of toxicants are particularly upset
about the number of nontarget species which have been killed by poisons
in the past. The Vest contains a number of birds and animals which
are on the Department of the Interior's Rare and Endangered Species
List includingI the Utah prairie dog (Cynomys parvidens), San Joaquin
kit fo)f (Vulpes macrotis mutica), grizzly bear (Ursus horrlbllus),
black-footed ferret (Mustela nlgripes). California condor (Gyanogyps
califomianus). Prairie falcon (Falco mexlcanus), and peregrine falcon
(Falco peregrinus anatum)•

In addition, other western animals whose

status is presently undetermined may already be rare or endangered.
Following are animals whose status is not known at this timet

Arizona

prairie dog (Cynomys ludovisianus arlzonensis), Chiricahua squirrel
(Sclurus chiricahuae), pine marten (Martes americana), northern swift
fox (Vulpes velox hebes). Texas kangaroo rat (Pipodonys elator). fisher
(Martes pennantl), wolverine (Gulo gulo), and Canada lynx (Lynx
canadensis).
All of these birds and mammals in the West could conceivably
be adversely affected by direct or secondary toxicant consumption.
Another point in contention when considering poisons Is whether
they should be used for emergency control of wildlife diseases trans
missible to man and domestic animals. Toxicants can presently be used
in "emergency situations'* with permission from the Environmental
Protection Agency. Strychnine-Injected eggs for rabid skunk control
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are now being used In eastern Montana where a number of rabid skunks
have been found In the past few years. Individuals who oppose anytoxicant use whatsoever believe that poison use cannot be justified
even for rabies control.
The Economics of Predator Control
The economic considerations involved in the total livestockcoyote management controversy present some of the most in^rtant and
complex questions which have yet to be answered. Economics as related
to predator management and the livestock industry encompass many
different areas including value of livestock lost to prédation, damage
assessment, value of predators, costs versus benefits of control
programs, and costs of livestock operations.
There is no doubt that coyotes and other predators annually
inflict heavy financial losses on segments of the livestock industry,
most notably the wool growers. How these losses are distributed and
the extent to which they affect the economic wellbelng of the indust
ries in total are points in contention. Sheep ranchers attribute the
decline of their Industry mainly to the financial losses inflicted
by coyotes.

A frequently heard statement is, "The coyotes are driving

me out of business."

One study In Montana attempted to find the major

economic factors affecting the State's sheep industry. Fifty percent
of the wool growers responded and stated the major factors (in order
of importance) were (l) predators, (2) prices, (3) weather, (4) disease,
(5) lambing complications, and (6) parasites (Seyler, 1973)*
Conservation groups counter the sheep raisers' claims by saying
that the Industry has been on the decline for the past thirty years
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and that the decline had started while predator control programs were
in full effect*

Conservationists generally attribute the decline

of the sheep industry to various factors other than predators*

Some

of these factors are (l) labor shortages and increased operational
costs in sheep ranching, (2) competition from foreign markets, (3) low
prices for wool and lamb, and (4) sheep ranchers turning to cattle
raising*

In addition, control opponents state that the sheep industry

has declined even with predator control, wool incentive payments, and
wool tariffs all in effect. If the industry were economically viable,
it should be able to survive with all this assistance*
As a final point, conservation groups believe that when coyote
control programs are initiated, little or no thought is given to the
economic value of the coyote to the ecology of the range*

They point

out that the coyote is extremely valuable in removing rodents and
in helping to keep their populations In check*
Effectiveness of Control Programs
A main issue within the predator control controversy centers
around the problem of characterizing the sheep loss situation*

Of

equal importance is determination of the extent to which coyote con
trols have reduced or prevented livestock losses, and the extent to
which coyote controls have affected coyote populations. Until recently,
little or no attempt has been made to evaluate coyote controls*

It

was merely assumed that since livestock losses were occurIng, coyote
control was necessary and justified*
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Prevention of Livestock Losses
Sheepmen and other livestock producers have consistently
criticized predator control operations for not providing adequate
protection from depredations. Even with chemical controls In effect,
most wanted more Intensive efforts made*

Claims of skyrocketing losses

have Increased markedly since the abandonment of chemical controls, and
confidence in the alternate, mechanical methods is lacking.
Opponents of present control programs believe that the losses
claimed by sheep ranchers are usually Inflated purposely as one means
of perpetuating controls and having more Intensive control measures
initiated. Conservationists also note that the natural animosity of
ranchers towards coyotes often causes the rancher to blame the coyote
for losses brought about by other factors such as disease or Inclement
weather. In further argument against coyote controls, the opposing
faction feels that the available government sources of livestock loss
data are Inaccurate and biased, depending too much on reports from the
stockmen themselves. It is to the rancher's benefit to Inflate his
losses for Income tax purposes. In addition, future funding levels
for Federal control programs are usually based on past or anticipated
losses, so to get more money it is advantageous to claim more losses.
Even the government field agents do not escape the conservationists'
attention, they believe that the agent often Inflates loss claims
himself in order to justify his position as a predator control agent.
As a final point, opponents say that livestock losses for the Industry
as a whole are acceptable. Only a few ranchers aire suffering heavy
losses of stock while the majority sustain light losses, which should
be considered one of the risks Involved In livestock production.
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Reduction of Coyote Numbers
The overall effectiveness of coyote control programs is deter
mined not only ty livestock-loss prevention, or reduction, but also ty
the success in reducing coyote numbers.
One of the major questions is the effectiveness of coyote
reduction to date. Both livestock interests and environmentalists
generally agree that the coyote population of the West has increased
from previous levels with reduction programs in effect. The debate
here is whether the high coyote populations are a function of
inadequate controls or other factors. Ranchers, of course, tend to
blame ineffective controls.
The groups holding the opposite view blame current control, but
for other reasons.

Most opponents are of the opinion that high coyote

numbers simply reflect normal population fluctuations in response to
an increased food base. It has been shown that range damage caused ly
sheep often gives rise to rodent irruptions which, in turn, result in
corresponding increases in coyote numbers. Control efforts have
attempted to increase coyote mortality but become ineffective if
reproduction proceeds at higher rates. Those opposing present manage
ment policies center most of their arguments on the ineffective
philosophy of general coyote suppression.

Not only has this policy

failed, but loss reports have Increased. It would be far better to
concentrate on the coyotes doing the actual killing rather than on the
population as a whole. Equal or better effectiveness could be achieved
from a policy of this type and present controls could be scaled down
considerably.

It has been maintained that only a few coyotes in

locality are stock killers and, therefore, mass population reduction is
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neither justified nor desirable.
Private Interests Versus Public Interests
In Coyote Control
Another of the seemingly endless areas of disagreement within
the issue of predator control involves certain moral questions. This
conflict revolves around two points* (l) funding of the animal damage
control program, and (2) management of public lands.

Funding
Criticism has recently been leveled by the public and various
environmental groups over the financing of coyote control programs.
These individuals point out that public funds are being used to help
support the privately owned livestock Industry, an Industry that favors
eradication of the coyote. The funds are of two types| wool incentive
payments (derived from Federal appropriations), and public monies
spent for predator control (derived from PedereLl appropriations and
hunting license fees at the State level). Most critics do not strongly
oppose the wool Incentive payments| however, they do object to use of
public monies for control work. Critics state that if livestock
Interests want predator control they should finance It themselves. In
total. Coyote control should not be a government obligation just
because sheep and cattle graze on public lands. Coyote depredations
should be considered one of the risks of producing livestock.
Management of Public Lands
Public lands In the West are used extensively for grazing by
private livestock Interests. Critics maintain that the livestock
industry unfairly benefits from the practice because of the lower than

average grazing fees charged on public lands and also because of
control of coyotes on public lamds. The Important objection concerns
the killing of the public's coyotes on the public's lands, for the
benefit of private Interests. Opponents of control find the coyote to
be of aesthetic value and claim that this value Is not taken Into consi
deration when policy for public land management Is planned.

CHAPTER III
HISTORY OP PREDATOR CONIROL
Federal
Prédation on domestic livestock began with the pioneers* first
settlements In this country*

In the colony of Massachusetts, lawmkers

passed the first bounty law In 1630. As the country expanded westward,
other bounty ^sterns were Initiated as the range livestock industry
developed. During the earliest periods of the country's growth the
only means of controlling predators was through individual hunting and
trapping efforts.
Because of pressure brought to bear on the Federal Government
to assist in alleviating livestock losses, the Bureau of Biological
Survey conducted field studies on wolf and coyote populations between
1907 and 1914#

At this time the newly formed Forest Service was

collecting grazing fees for the private use of public lands under its
administration*

Because of this, the Federal Government felt obligated

to offer protection to the livestock grazing on public lands. Thus, in
191$, Congress authorized $125,000 for the Bureau of Biological Survey
to enter dizrectly into predator control activities.
In 1931* Congress passed the Animal Damage Control Act.

The

current predator control program is based upon this act which directs
the Secretary of the Interior to conduct campaigns for the control of
animals Injurious to agriculture, livestock, and people. The program

-14-
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was to be conducted in cooperation with the States and with local
cooperators.
Under federal reorganization in 1939, responsibility for predator
control was transferred to the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Depart
ment of the Interior,

This was renamed the Bureau of Sports Fisheries

and Wildlife.
Once fully involved in animal damage control activities, the
government found numerous and very complex problems to be solved.
Administrative mistakes ocurred as did mistakes at the figld level.
Charges of Indiscriminate killing of wildlife and over-control were
leveled at the Bureau. Predator control had become such a hot issue
at this time that a professional investigation was Initiated into
control activities by the Secretary of the Interior's Advisory Board
on Wildlife Management. Their final report, common^ called the
Leopold Report, became a partial basis for future Federal policy. The
1964 report to Secretary Udall led to the formation of the Division
of Wildlife Services of the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife,
The Leopold Report was based upon a philosophy of minimum effective
control. The stated tenets were; (l) all native animals are resources
of inherent Interest and value to the people; consequently, basic
governmental policy should be one of husbandry of all forms of wildlife,
and (2) at the same time, local population control is an essential
part of management policy where a species is causing significant
damage to other resources or where it endangers human health or safety.
In such cases, control should be limited strictly to the offending
species, preferably to the troublesome Individuals, and only to the
localities where danger or damage exists, (Leopold, etal,, 1964),
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At the conclusion of the study, the Leopold Committee felt that
predator and rodent control, as practiced by the government agencies,
was considerably in excess of the amount that could be justified in
terms of the total public interest.

Therefore, the Committee recom

mended that before predator control activities were initiated, a clearly
demonstrated need should be shown. Other major recommendations of
the Leopold Committee were as follows* (l) the appointment of a
predator and rodent control board advisory to the Secretary of the
Interior, (z) improvements in predator and rodent control operations,
(a) explicit criteria to guide control decisions, (b) continued
cooperative programs to be maintained with other agencies, (c) proof
of control needed (documentation), (d) extension trapper programs
replacing bounty schemes, (e) flying squads of control agents to be
maintained to cope with rabies outbreaks (in the eastern U.S.), (3)
greatly amplified research programs for specific control devises, and
(4) legal controls to regulate the use of poisons in control operations,
and to prevent shipment of such poisons to foreign countries lacking
adequate conlxols.
The Leopold Committee was opposed to broadcast poiTOning of
rodents because of the danger to non target speciesf however, they
found nothing wrong with using 1060 poison bait stations for coyote
control. The Committee recommended that one 1060 station be used per
township in control areas.
The Leopold Report brought few changes in the govermental
control program mainly because of resistance to change at administrative
aM field levels and also because the livestock industry continued to
give their support to the old system. This was not popular with the
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general public because of a growing environmental awareness and concern
over animal damage control programs. At this time, an incidwit ocurred
which aroused the public to such an extent that another government
commission was formed to study predator control activities. Twentytwo bald and golden eagles were found dead from thallium poisoning in
Wyoming. These birds were killed y&ien they ingested poison bait meant
for coyotes. Further investigation showed that numerous other species
of nontarget animals had also been victims of either direct or secondary
poisonings in the West.
The 7 man committee, formed to reevaluate the predator control
•progtaM, was headed by Dr. Stanley Cain.

It was commissioned by the

Secretary of the Interior, Rogers fbrton, and the Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality in May of 1971#

Their findings,

referred to as the Cain Report,^ were published in January of 1972 and
formed the basis for Executive action immediately there after.
The Cain Committee found numerous failures in the administration
of the federal control program at both the administrative and field
levels. It also noted that the government program did not take into
account the full spectrum of public interests and values not only in
predators but in all wildlife. These values will be discussed later
in the paper.
The Cain Committee recommended the following solutions to the
problems in predator controli (l) continued federal-state cooperation
in predator control, and with eJ.1 funds in its stqsport to come from

^Predator Control 1971» Report to the Council on Environmental
Quality and the Department of the Interior by the Advisory Committee
on Predator Control. Washington, D.C., 207 p.
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Congress and Iqr the state legislatures, (2) immediate Congressional
action should be sought to remove all existing toxic chemicals from
registration and use for operational predator control.

Also, these

restrictions should extend to those toxicants used in field rodent
control whose action is characterized ly the secondary poisoning of
scavengers. Pending, and in addition to such Congressional Action,
the Secretary of the Interior should disallow use of poisons in the
Federal predator and rodent control program, and that this ruling be
made a standard in cooperative agreements with the States. It is also
recommended that the individual states pass legislation

ban the use

of toxicants in predator control, (3) the field force of the Division
of Wildlife Services be professionalized to emphasize employment of
qualified biologists capable of administrating and demonstrating a
broadly-based program of predator management, (4) all states establish
a cooperative trapper-trainer extension program as a means of aiding
landowners in the minimum necessary control of predators on private
lands, (5) it is recommended that Congress provide some means of
alleviating the economic burden of livestock producers wlw experience
heavy losses Ty predators, (6) grazing permits and leases written by
Federal land management agencies should provide for possible suspension
or revocation of grazing privileges if regulations governing predator
control are violated, (?) all methods of predator control should be
prohibited on statutory Wilderness Areas, (8) federal and state
legislation should be passed that would make the shooting of wildlife
from aircraft, including predators and game animals, illegal except
under exceptional circumstances and then only by authorized wildlife
biologists of the appropriate Federal and State agencies, (9) the
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Federal Aviation Authority should make a provision for suspending or
revoking the license of a private pilot and the confiscation of the
aircraft when the pilot knowingly carries a passenger whose acts lead
to conviction for illegal predator control, such as shooting from the
aircraft or distributing poisons, (lO) it is recommended that action be
taken by Congress to rule out the broadcast of toxicants for the control
of rodents, rabbits, and other vertebrate pests on federal lands, and
that the possibility of correlative action be explored for private
lands as well, (ll) it is recommended that a long term research
program be based in the Division of Wildlife Research, Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife, that would cover the gamut of ecological prob
lems associated with predators, (12) the Divisions of Wildlife Research
of the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife should undertake a
detailed socio-economic study of cost-benefit ratios of predator
control as a means of evaluating the need for and the efficacy of the
program and its separate parts, (13) the Division of Wildlife Research
of the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife should be delegated the
responsibility for the study of the epidemiology of rabies in the
field by a team of specialists provided with adequate funding, (l4)
Congress should give the Secretary of Interior authority to take
measures necessary to protect all species of predators that have been
placed on the Endangered List by the Federal Government, 2nd (15) it is
recommended that the several States take measures to supplement the
federal protection of rare and endangered species by enacting laws
and taking measures to protect locally rare populations.
One month following publication of the Cain Report, the
President of the United States, in response to the committee's second
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recommendation, issued Executive Order #11643 (Appendix l). The
Executive Order of February 8, 1972, removed all toxic chemicals from
registration and use in operational predator control on federal lands.
The Executive Order also prohibited federal participation the use
of such toxicants, but it did provide that under Section 3b (l, 2, and
3) the heads of Federal agencies may authorize the emergency use of
chemical toxicants for the purpose of killing predatory animals fori
(l) the protection of health or safety of human lives, (2) the preser
vation of wildlife species threatened with extinction, and (3) the
prevention of irretrievable damage to nationally significant natural
resources.
On Iterch 9. 1972, William Ruckleshaus, then the administrator for
the Environmental Protection Agency, issued "Pesticides Regulation
Notice 7202" (Appendix 2). This notice suspended the registration
for all products containing sodium cyanide, sodium monofluoroacetate
(1080), or strychnine for use against mammalian predators, and stated
that they be cancelled and suspended at once. In addition, the notice
prevented the interstate commerce of predacides.
The activities of the Bureau's Division of Wildlife Services
were directly affected by the ban on toxicants and Pesticides Notice
72-2. The Bureau remained responsible, however, for fulfilling the
Federal responsibility of controlling animal damage as directed by
Congress (Act of March 2, 1931; 46 Stat. 1468, 7 U.S.C. 426-426b). In
order to fulfill this responsibility the Secretary of the Interior
ordered an accelerated program of animal damage control services*
This program has the following objectives: (l) conducting a carefully
planned special effort to reduce depredations in the most critical
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areas, usiner nontoxic methods, from the spring natality period through
the fall marketing period, and (2) to maintain liaison and relation
ships with appropriate State officials, land managing agencies, other
cooperation agencies, and representatives of the livestock industry.
To accomplish this. Bureau funds were reprogrammed to increase the
capabilities to control predator damage ty increased use of nonchemical tools (USDI, 1973).
From April 1? to June 30, 1972 a total of $278,500 was author
ized to be expended ty the Division of Wildlife Services, The
Division was also authorized to increase first quarter spending during
Fiscal Year 1973 by an additional $70,000#

Therefore, from April 17-

September 30, 1972, the total funds made available for the special
program amounted to $349,500.
As of January 1, 1972, it was estimated by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture that there were 13,190,000 sheep and lambs valued at
about $300,000,000 in the 15 States where the accelerated program was
conducted. By April, these population figures had nearly doubled
because of lambing.
A comparison of the confirmed losses identified by Wildlife
Services personnel in the major livestock classes during the April 1September 30, 1972, period indicated that the numbers of confirmed losses
of sheep, goats, and poultry killed increased when compared to the same
period in 1971*

During the five month period, 14,750 sheep, 796 cattle

and calves, 1,376 goats, and 8,131 head of poultry valued at $521,427
were confirmed as killed by predators.
The emphasis in the special program was on reducing livestock
depredations caused by coyotes, though needs varied from State to State,
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Main reliance was placed upon the increased use of aircraft, both
helicopters and fixed wing, although all other methods of mechanical
control were used.
During the five month period, 8,149 coyotes were taken ty all
methods, although aircraft gunning accounted for the majority.
Results of the special effort showed that in many areas losses
were definitely controlled and/or prevented; however, in other areas
depredations were not controlled or prevented. In taking everything
into account, the Bureau felt that it had conducted an effective,
selective, efficient, and safe non-chemical program of coyote damage
control ^ parts of most States.

Without using toxicants, and in full

con^liwce with the Executive order, the program was successful in
effecting a significant reduction in anticipated depredations in highly
critical areas over the West. This success is conditioned by the fact
that toxicants had been employed prior to February 8, and some reduc
tion in the coyote populations had already been accomplished. In most
areas where the accelerated effort was applied, however, depredations
were held at a level comparable to or lower than previous years (USDI,
1972).
The information gained by the Department of the Interior was not
accepted by most livestock producers who wanted use of poisons rein
stated for predator control.

They felt that poisons were the most

important weapon that was available to protect their stock. Stockmen
have combined their political power in the past two years in the effort
to have poisons reinstated. Last year, more than 20 western senators,
using figures supplied by the sheep industry, blamed the Interior
Department for the loss of over 800,000 sheep ("mostly young lambs")
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as a result of the toxicant ban (Relger, 1974)*
Most of the livestock producers' arguments have been countered
by conservation groups but It is clear that the predator control
controversy Is far from settled. In the meantime, the Department of
the Interior has experienced budget cuts that severely threatens their
ability to carry out an effective non-chemical predator control
program. Congress, therefore, is now faced with repealing the
Executive order in response to ranchers' demands for greater protection,
or enacting legislation that will enlarge the available funding and
manpower by transferring predator control responsibility to the States
with cooperating Federal funds*
Numerous bills were introduced In the 92nd Congress concerning
animal damage control; however, the issue was unresolved. The issue Is
now under consideration in the 93rd Congress. Following are the bills
presently before Congress and the hearings which have been held thus
far:
Legislation
H.R, 38. Mr. Dlngell, et al.; 1/3/73
Merchant Marine and Fisheries
A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assist the
States In controlling the damage caused Ty predatory animals| to
establish a program of research concerning the control and conserva
tion of predatory animals; to restrict the use of toxic chemicals as a
method of predator control; and for other purposes.
H.R. 4759. Mr. Dlngell, et al.; 2/27/73
Merchant Marine and Fisheries
A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assist the
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States in controlling damage caused by predatory and depredating
animalst to establish a program of research concerning the control and
conservation of predatory and depredating animals; to restrict the use
of toxic chemicals as a method of predator control; and for other
purposes.
S, 819. Mr. Bayh, et al.; 2/8/73
Commerce
A bill to authorize a national policy and program with respect
to wild predatory mammals; to prohibit the poisoning of animals and
birds on the public lands of the United States; to regulate the
manufacture, sale, and possession of certain chemical toxicants.
S. 887. Mr. %rrd, et al.; 2/15/73
Commerce
A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to assist the
States in controlling damage caused by predatory and depredating
animals; to establish a program of research concerning the control and
conservation of predatory and depredating animals; to restrict the use
of toxic chemicals as a method of predator control.
Hearings
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations, Predator Control
and Related Problems. 92nd Congress, 1st Session, June 2, and 3, 1971;
August 2 and 3, 1971.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Predator Control
and Related Problems. 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, December 14-17, and
December 20, 1971
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
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Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation. Predatory Animals
and Endangered Species*

92nd Congress, 2nd Session, March 20-21, and

April 10 and 11, 1972.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee on the
Environment. Federal Animal Damage Control Act of 1972. 92nd Congress,
2nd Session. August 7 and 8, 1972.
U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Agriculture. Indemnification for
Livestock Killed ty Predatory Animals. 92nd Congress, 2# Session.
April 25, 1972.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation smd the Environment.
93rd Congress, 1st Session, March 19, 20, 1973»
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture. 93rd Congress, 1st
Session, September 18 and 26, 1973#
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Subcommittee on Public Lemds. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, February 27,
March 4, and April 3, 1974.
The question of the need for new predator control legislation
had been debated extensively during the predator control hearings of
1972 and before. Witnesses representing livestock Interests during the
1973 hearings again focused their statements primarily on the issue of
need. Generally centering on the essentiality of chemical toxicants In
controlling damage caused ly predatory animals, testimony by the live
stock industry attested to the growing number of losses due particularly
to coyotes during the past few years and especially since the Federal
ban on the use of predator poisons. They emphasized the need for these
chemicals and the ineffectiveness of alternative methods of control.
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In further testimony, livestock Interests were often of the
opinion that there was no need for further legislation. It was pointed
out that the necessary statutory authority to permit supervised use of
toxic chemicals for the control of predators is available under the
provisions of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972
(Public Law 92-516).
Briefly, the bills presently before Congress authorize the
Secretary of the Interior to assist the States In controlling damage
caused by predatory animals, to establish a program of research
concerning the control and conservation of predatory animals, and to
restrict the use of toxic chemicals as a method of predator control.
This last provision would enact into law the February 1972 Executive
Order 11643 banning the use of chemical toxicants for the control of
predatory animals on Federal lands and in Federal programs*

I^

addition, the proposals would repeal, in Its entirety, the 1931 Act
pertaining to the eradication and control of predatory animals.
The administration's bill, H,R, 4759 has three main differences
from the other proposals. First, it would not, as would the other bills,
require the wildlife agency of a State to be the agency to administer
the predator control program authorized to be carried out under the
Federal financial assistance plan. It would leave to the individual
States the decision on which State awncy would administer the program.
Second, it would eliminate a provision in the other bills that specif
ically authorized the use of chemical toxicants in emergency situations
to prevent major damage to domestic livestock. And third, the
Administration's bill would provide that the Secretary of the Interior
"may" (at his discretion) rather than "shall", as designated by other
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bills, provide Federal operational assistance as he may deem necessary
(Musgrove, 1974)*
On November 6, 1973» the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment, of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, introduced H.R, 11266, This bill is intended to
be a compromise bill to H.R. 38 and H.H. 4759#

H.R. 11266 specifically

allows the use of sodium cyanide in its provisions for emergency use#
The bill also provides that any other toxicant as defined under its
provisions may also be used under the conditions, provided it has no
secondary poisoning effects and kills animals quickly and painlessly.
Passage of any predator control legislation during the 93r*i
Congress is unlikely. This Is unfortunate because the Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife budget for control activities in Fiscal Year
1975 includes an additional $2 million for research and control
activities. Its use is contingent upon passage of the legislation
under consideration.
Montana
Predator control began in Montana in 1879 when the Territorial
Legislature authorized County Commissioners to pay bounties on certain
predatory animals (Mitchell and Greer, 1971). In 1925» the Fish and
Gajne Commission, for the first time, transferred $7,500 to the Live
stock Fund for bounty control work. This was not successful in
controlling the predators which killed livestock. Even so, bounty
payments were halted in 1962, Carter County still pays a bounty on
coyotes.
When Congress passed the Animal Damage Control Act in 1931, the
Bureau of Biological Survey, in cooperation with the Montana Livestock

Commission, and cooperating counties developed a State predator control
program.
From 19^7 to 1971, the Montana Department of Livestock was
advised lay a Governors Advisory Committee on Predatory Animal Control.
The Committee vas established by the 1^4-7 Legislative Assembly
consisting of representatives from the Montana Stockgrowers Association,
Montana Wildlife Federation, Montana Fish and Game Commission, and the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

This committee advised the

Department of Livestock regarding practical methods for control,
expenditure of funds, and development of a statewide predator control
program whereby the most efficient results could be derived. Under
State Reorganization in 1971» the Advisory Committee was abolished
(Montana Department of Livestock, 1974).
Currently the Montana Department of Livestock enters into
agreements with the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife, and the Montana Department of Fish and Game
for the purpose of formulating and conducting a practical predatory
animal control program In Montana. The Montana County Commissioners,
Montana Woolgrowers Association, U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of
Land Management, and local livestock associations have direct input
into the planning of the program (Montana Department of Livestock,
1974).
Over the years, cooperative funds spent for predator control
activities have increased markedly from the original $7,500 spent
in 1925 to the proposed $451,071 for 1974. Funds for the program are
derived from four sources;

Montana Fish and Game Department - $40,000

(accumulated from hunting license fees), counties - $88,000 (derived
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from license fees at 10 to 15 cents on all sheep one year or older),
Montana Department of Livestock - $165»821 (derived from

mill levy

on sheep» and a 2 mill levy on other livestock), and Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife $157»250. A full breakdown in expenditures for
fiscal year 1974 may be found in Appendix-3*
Individual ranchers usually are responsible for initiating
predator control operations within a given locale. If the rancher
feels that coyotes are killing his sheep, he files a Request for
Services Form with the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife Office in
Billings, Montana. Upon receipt of the form, the Bureau dispatches a
field agent from the rancher's district to kill the offending animals.
Theoretically, if he is successful, prédation upon the rancher's stock
will cease.
Stockmen in Montana were vigorously opposed to the ban on toxi
cant use in 1972, as were stockmen in other states throughout the West.
By using their combined political power, the West's livestock producers
influenced the Environmental Protection Agency to authorize an
experimental program using the M-44 poison dispensing device for coyote
control*

In January 1974, the EPA announced that it would permit the

experimental use of the M-44 to collect data for use in
possibly registering sodium cyanide for predator control purposes.
Texas was the first state designated to implement the program, because
its lambing season is earlier than most states (Washington News, 1974).
In Montana, the experimental M-44 program is being carried out
in the 21 largest sheep producing countries, and will be continued
until October of 1975•

Control counties will be chosen to monitor

prédation without the M-44 in use. According to an order issued by
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James L. Agee, acting assistant administrator for water and hazardous
materials, the following 21 counties will be used to test the M-W-:
Carter, Custer, Garfield, Petroleum, Phillips, Powder River, Rosebud,
Beaverhead, Madison, Carbon, Fergus, Judith Basin, Musselshell,
Stillwater, Sweet Grass, Teton, Wheatland, Dawson, McCone, Gallatin,
and Meagher (Mlssoulian, May 31» 197^)•

The M-44 may be used in these

counties only, its use banned by federal law everywhere else.
According to the EPA plan, the cyanide capsule, to be used In
the M-44 ejector mechanism, will be made available to state-licensed
trappers under the supervision of the Montana Department of Livestock.
The EPA stated that the main purpose of the experimental program
is to determine the effectiveness of using the poison in preventing
or reducing livestock losses when used In conjunction with trapping,
denning, shootings, serial hunting, and other methods.
The antidote, amyl nitrate capsules, must also be made available
in all locations where the sodium cyanide is used in case of accidental
poisonings (Mlssoulian, May 31» 1974).
Montana wool growers aO-most unanimously favor intensified control
efforts and desire the reinstatement of poisons for coyote control.
The latest action by the stockmen has been a campaign to allow
aerial hunting for coyotes by private citizens. Ranchers told the
Montana Livestock Board that, unless aerial hunting of coyotes and
foxes Is allowed, the State's sheep industry could be wiped out Ty the
predators. The testimony was presented as the Board considered rules
to license and regulate year-round hunting of predators from aircraft.
Ranchers feel that, since poisons are banned, increased aerial hunting
Is the most effective means of regulating coyotes. The Montana Wool
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Growers Association submitted a statement noting that aerial hunting
will be controversial, and applauding the Board for drafting rules
which are claimed to Include extensive safeguards.
The rules would allow hunting of coyotes and foxes only to
protect livestock and not for recreation. All aircraft pilots Involved
In the program would have to be licensed ty the Livestock Department
and gunners would be limited to using shotguns no larger than 10
gauge. Aerial hunting would be allowed only on lands where permission
had previously been given by landowners.
On April 8, 1974, the Montana State Department of Livestock
Issued an Environmental Impact Statement on the Montana Predatory
Animal Control Program. Hearings were held In Poison, Lewlstown, and
Miles City to test public reaction to the proposed program. Elements
of the plan Included Increased aerial hunting, trapping, and denning
of coyotes.

The Department proposes to hire 17 full-time trappers,

4 part-time trappers, and 10 pilots to Implement the program. The
Impact Statement said that the State's sheep losses have Increased
markedly since the toxicant ban. No adverse environmental effects
are anticipated from the proposed predator control program.

CHAPTER Tf

METHODS FOR PREDATOR CONTROL

Historically, relatively few methods have been used to reduce
predatory animal populations*

Methods to date have been aimed at

killing the animal causing the damage or, more commonly, at general
population suppression (proptylactic control). Only recently, has
research turned to non-lethal means for controlling animal damage.

Bounty Systems
A bounty may be defined as a predetermined amount of money
paid to an individual upon presentation of satisfactory evidence of
>\
\

the destruction of a specified animal.
The bounty is the oldest wildlife management technique still
in existence.

Ancient writings tell of bounties paid, for wolves

nearly 3,000 years ago ty the Greeks in attemptA^o protect their
domestic animals.
The bounty system was brought to North America

by the first

settlers and it eventually became widespread throughout the United
States and Canada. The town of Dover, New Hampshire,. paid bounties
on wolves to both Indians fpad whltemen as early as 1657. Since that
time, more than one-hundred species of animals h^ve appeared on
North America bounty lists (Latin, 1971).
-32-

Bounties are still being paid in various States for a variety
of animal species although the practice has been largely discontinued.
The two main objectives of bounty systems, (l) keeping coyotes and
other predators at low population levels, smd (2) protection of
livestock, have not been accomplished.
While bounties are still being paid in mai^ states, the prac
tice is objectionable to most wildlife scientists for the following
reasons: (l) the bounty system is based on a "shotgun" philosophy
for control; it is wasteful of both animal life and money, (2) bounty
payments have failed to keep predator populations at low levels, (3)
high to induce hunter participation. At a certain point bounty pay
ments may equal or exceed the value of the livestock being protected,
and (4) current bounty systems usually have loopholes which invite
fraudulent claims (eg., raising coyotes to turn in for payments or
bringing animals from outside bounty areas for payments)*
Nielsen (1973), suggests that if bounty systems are to be used,
they could be made more effective in several ways. First, a uniform
bounty system covering several states would be necessary to optimize
effectiveness. This would limit the problems of coyotes being killed
in one state and bountied in another and the problem where coyotes
move from heavily hunted states to states where hunting pressure is
light. Secondly, a bounty on female coyotes only or a higher bounty
on females could, in the long run, be more effective than a general
bounty. Thirdly, a very high bounty might be paid for pregnant
females only. Of course, identification of pregnant females In the
field would be difficult.

Extension Systems

The Missouri System of Extension Predator Control has been
in effective operation since 19*^5. It has been highly satisfactory
from both the public relations and economic standpoints. Its
effectiveness is due primarily to a logical, direct sin^llcity.
Essentially, it consists of training the landowner suffering damage
to eliminate the specific Individual doing it (Nagel, 1972).
An Important and desirable point of the Missouri Extension
System is that it concentrates on the individual doing the damage
while the rest of its species, (by far the majority), remain to
contribute their benefits as parts of the animal community.
An analysis of the extension system, following eight years of
operation, found the annual costs to be about $11,500 (with two
trapper instructors) in comparison with annual coyote bounty payments
rsunging from $55,000 to $165,000. It was also found that the
trained farmer averaged 17.8 hours trap-tending time to catch a
coyote, while the government trapper average was 60.3 hours. For
the 26 years that this program has been operating in Missouri,
ranchers have reduced their damage losses an average of 80 per cent.
Although this system works well in Missouri and Kansas, there
is a question whether it would work as well in the ¥est where ranches
are much larger and coyote populations are very high*
Shooting

Shooting predators from the ground is the oldest, and probab
ly least effective means for reducing their populations. Even
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trained hunters often have difficulty because of the Intelligence and
elusiveness of the larger carnivores. A variety of methods are used
including*

calling (imitating the sound of a prey species to attract

the predator), hunting from horseback, and using dogs. Although
lacking in effectiveness, ground shooting is entirely selective for
the species being hunted#
Aerial hunting has proven to be a very effective means of
taking coyotes in some locations; however, it is subject to several
limitations. Ihe cost of hunting from aircraft can be prohibitive.
Following the poison ban in 1972, the Department of the Interior
attempted to evaluate mechanical control methods in a section of the
Bridger National Forest in Wyoming. They found that the cost of
operating a helicopter was $125.00 per hour. Costs for fixed-wing
aircraft were not as high; however, they were not as effective as the
copters. Average costs for all aircraft in the Bridger Study
amounted to $61.01 per adult coyote taken.
An evaluation of aircraft use in 14 states revealed that
helicopters were 93 per cent more effective and 214 per cent more
expensive than fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, aerial control was
used effectively in the spring and summer, in lower more open country,
and mainly on coyotes.

Aerial hunting was not effective (l) in

protecting poultry, (2) in rugged terrain, (3) in dense vegetation,
(4) in bad weather, and (5) on small carnivores (USDI, 1972).
Aerial hunting has been used effectively in Montana in the
eastern half of the state where the terrain is relatively flat and
open. However, hunting from aircraft in the mountainous, western
half of Ifontana is difficult and not as effective.

36
Advantages of aerial hunting are that it is selective for the
species being hunted, and it allows the hunters to cover large areas.
Effective hunting from aircraft usually includes a ground crew to
locate the coyote and direct the plane*

Coyotes are located, on the

ground, using a technique called howl elicitation where a hand siren,
electric siren, or recording of a coyote is sounded, causing coyotes
in the area to howl in response. Coyotes may be located from aircraft
using grid searches of a particular area. When the coyote is located,
a gunner in the aircraft, usually equipped with a 12 gauge shotgun,
kills it.

TrwvlnK

Trapping is one of the most widely used methods for taking
coyotes and other predators. The steel-hold trap is the most
effective type of trap, and has been in use for about 300 years.
trapping has continued in its popularity as a coyote control
method because of its effectiveness in taking troublesome animais
which may have become "educated" to control procedures. With most
other methods, the coyote must not only be aware of the Implement or
material being used, but must react in a certain way to it; the teap
works successfully against such animals because they are unaware of
its presence (Robinson, 1962). Even so, some coyotes are not easily
trapped. There is evidence that coyotes can leam to avoid traps
(Robinson, 19*^8).
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Major disadvantages of using traps are the tine and attention
necessary for their operation; their inefficiency during periods of
wet and freezing weather; and the fact that other animals are often
unintentionally trapped.
Trapping has been used extensively ty both government agencies
and private individuals who purchase trapping licenses from the
State*

Although trapping has been effective in the haMs of trained

personnel, objections have been raised concerning the practice.
Probably the main complaints heard are that traps are non-selective
and inhumane.

Traps may be made more selective in the hands of

trained professionals, using knowledgable placement. Devices making
them more humane include; padded jaws, off-set jaws, and tranquilizer
tabs attached to the traps (Baiser, 1965)*

Pennine
This is a coyote control method used in the spring. Following
whelping of the coyote pups and location of the den, the pups are
destroyed. Although simple in principle, denning can be extremely
difficult in the absence of good tracking conditions on the ground.
Coyote dens can also be located from aircraft in open country. Und#r
ideal conditions for locating the coyote's lair, denning can be an
effective control technique. High prédation by coyotes often
coincides with pup rearing during the spring and summer because th#
adults must kill more frequently to feed the pups. Removing the
young, during this period, can have a beneficial effect for the live
stock in the area.
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Toxicants

Experiments using poison bait stations for coyote control began
in 1937*

These experiments were carried out by the Control Methods

Research Laboratory of the U. S. Biological Sarrvy Agency. In the
beginning, strychnine, thallium sulfaté, and soditun monofluoroacetate
(Compound 1080) were the only toxicants used for predator control
work. Poisons used for government predator and rodent control
programs (not available to the general public) are manufactured and
stored in the Pocatello Stqaply Depot in Pocatello, Idaho. The depot
is still producing strychnine and sodium cyanide for emergency
predator control situations and e3q>erimental purposes. Poisons are
also produced for bird and non-predatory animal control which was not
affected by Executive Order 116!&3*
Following are the major poisons which have been used in
predator control, their properties, methods of application, and ^wlr
objectionable characteristics.

Strychnine
Six products containing strychnine were registered for use in
controlling predatory animals. Strychnine, an extremely bitter
tasting, white crystal, is a coi^lex, naturally occurring, organic
compound. Although the poison will probably bind to soil and
decompose over a period of time, information on its persistence is
limited. Strychnine is highly toxic to humans and animals.
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milligram dose is considered a threat to the life of an adult human
and deaths have been reported from doses as little as 5 to 10
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milligrams. Only small amounts of strychnine are needed to poison
most animals.
Strychnine acts ty interfering with the animal's normal neural
processes, causing extreme muscle contractions and convulsions.
Death due to respiratory failure follows. There is no true effective
antidote for strychnine poisoning.
In predator control work, strychnine is usually placed in lard
or tallow drop baits and distributed along coyote travelways or near
carcasses.
Initially, strychnine was a very effective predator control
poison and was credited with nearly exterminating the wolf in the
United States. However, its original effectiveness diminished as
coyotes and wolves learned to avoid its taste and smell. Strychnine
is still In use for rabid skunk control.
The major arguments against strychnine use are that it is
inhumane (the death process being long and painful), that it is
nonselective, and that it can be responsible for secondary poisoning
(scavengers may be killed "ty feeding on another animal killed by
strychnine poisoning).

Thallium Sulphate

Thallium sulphate was first used in predator control programs
in the late 19^0s. However, because of its high toxicity and
unselectiveness, its use was discontinued in the early 1950s. An
incident involving thallium in Wyoming was responsible for focusing
public attention on poison use more than anything else.

This
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occurred when 22 laid and golden eagles were killed from feeding on
antelope carcasses Injected with the poison. Subsequent investiga
tions showed that thallium had been responsible for numerous other
poisonings of non target species.
Thallium sulphate is a non selective toxicant, being poisonous
in the same degree to all species. Death from thallium poisoning is
slow and painful (usually 2 to 5 days, depending on dosage). Animals
consuming sublethal doses may require two weeks for full recovery.
There is no effective antidote for thallium poisoning following the
onset of its ^nptoms.

Sodium Ifonofluoroacetate (1080)
Sodium monofluoroacetate was first used in the late 1940s and
its use for predator control persisted until the ban on toxicants in
1972,

After initial applications in the West during the 1940s, stock

men reported marked reductions in losses from coyote prédation in
Colorado and Wyoming (Robinson, 1948).
Four products containing 1080 were registered for use as
mammalian predacides, and 1080 was also used in broadcast poisoning
of rodents. 1080 use was restricted to west of the 100th meridian
and to personnel of the Division of Wildlife Services or people under
their direct supervision.
Compound 1080 is a white powder, soluble in water. It is very
stable and, therefore, very persistent in ground water. The poison
acts rapidly on the central nervous system and cardiovascular system
with cardiac dysfunction resulting.
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When 1080 was used In coyote damage control operations, the
bait material, a carcass or portion of a carcass weighing 50 to 100
pounds, was treated at the rate of 1,6 grams of the poison per 100
pounds of bait materisil (35PPA)*

Baits were then placed at estab

lished crossings and driftways having maximum use by coyotes, in
habitats having minimum use by most non-target carnivorous species.
This practice, in conjunction with the Bureau policy of low density
bait placement (normally no more than one per township), and the
much smaller home ranges of most non-target carnivores, precluded a
large percentage of these non target animals from even encountering
the baits. Studies indicated that populations of non target
carnivorous species did not measurably decrease in the vicinity of
Bureau control operations in the past 30 years (Denver Wildlife
Research Center, Unpublished data) (Atzert, 1971).
According to Bureau policy, baits were placed as late in the
fall as practicable and removed early in the spring. Bait locations
were described in writing, and to further insure recovery, were
attached to immovable objects.

To protect domestic animals and man,

baits were placed only after written agreements were signed with the
landowner, lessee, or land administrator requesting coyote control*
The baits were placed only in sparsely inhabited areas, area residents
were notified, and appropriate warning signs posted.
The Bureau's use of sodium monofluoroacetate resulted in but
37 known incidents of domestic animal poisoning from 1959 through
1969. Ko human deaths have ever resulted from 1080 poisoning (Atzert,
1971).

kz
Sodium monofluoroacetate was a widely uset^oxlcant In predator
control programs mainly because It was much more toxic to canine
species than to other predators. For example, the LD50 (average
dosage required to kill one-half of a very large population of
animals) for coyotes Is ,1 milligram of 1080 per kilogram of body
weight while it is 1.25 to $.00 milligrams for the golden eagle.
However, non target species may be killed if they consume enough
material containing

1080.

1080 is 180 to 250 times as toxic to

coyotes as thallium sulphate (Robinson, 19^8).
For the five years preceding the toxicant ban, the following
amounts of 1080 were used by the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and
Wildlife for predator and rodent control (Baiser, 1973)*
Year

Rodents

Predators

1968

287 lbs.

37 lbs.

1969

242 lbs.

27 lbs.

1970

105 lbs.

39 lbs,

1971

111 lbs.

22 lbs.

1972

70 lbs.

17 lbs.

Objections to 1080 use were mainly that it was inhumane (death
coming usually after several hours from caoxiiac and/or central nervous
system failure) and relatively unselective. Evidence has shown that
non target species may be killed by consuming 1080 directly with the
bait material, by eating 1080 killed coyotes, or by eating the vomit
of a poisoned coyote (Robinson, 19^8) (Atzert, 1971). There is no
effective antidote following onset of the poison's symptoms.
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Sodium Cyanide
Sodium cyanide is a water soluble, white solid which reacts
with acids to form hydrogen cyanide gas. This chemical is among the
most toxic and rapidly acting of all known poisons. Ingestion or
inhalation of a very small dose (as little as 300 micrograms per
liter of air) may result in rapid death. Recent data show four
incidents involving cyanide compounds in Fiscal Year 1970, in three of
which, human beings were injured by cyanide guns (devices placed in
the field to dispense the cyanide) (Ruckleshaus, 1973)•

Coyote-getters
The coyote-getter is a baited explosive device designed to kill
coyotes by expelling a charge of sodium cyanide into the mouth when
the bait is tugged.

The "getter" (now replaced by the M-44 device)

consists of a hollow metal stake closed at the bottom, a firing
mechanism, a cartridge holder, and a 38 caliber cartridge containing
sodium cyanide.
Tô set the coyote-getter, the stake is driven into the ground;
the firing mechanism is attached to the top of the stake; and the
cartridge holder containing the cartridge (covered with paraffined
wool, cloth, or similar material to form the bait) is attached to the
top of the firing unit and scent is added.

When the coyote grasps

the bait and lifts, the cyanide is discharged into the coyote's mouth.
Death results in 30 to 60 seconds (Robinson, 1962)»
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Advantages of coyote-getters Include quick, humane action and
close recovery of the poisoned animal. In addition, Robinson (19^3)
found that coyote-getters were more efficient than steel traps because
they did not need to be tended as often and, hence, more and longer
"getter" lines could be used. In the same study. It was found that
the coyote-getter was essentially as effective (99*6 per cent) as the
steel trap In the number of animals taken and many times more
selective (traps took Vkl non predatory animals while the coyotegetters took only 26).
Objections to the coyote-getter were the danger to humans and
non target animals from the poison and the top wad from the cartridge
when It was fired.

The N-44 Device

In order to Improve safety In field operations and to Increase
public acceptance, tke Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife
developed the M-44 as a replacement for the coyote-getter. The
principal difference between the two Is a substitution of a spring
operated ejector mechanism for an explosive propellant*
The M-44 case Is loaded with 12 grams of sodium cyanide, an
additive to reduce caking, and a fluorescent tracer. There is a white
plastic plunger wad and rubber follower at the bottom and a rubber
wad at the top.

Both top and bottom are sealed with a clear flexible

sealant.
The trigger for the M-44 is the same as that used in the coyotegetter. Thrust is provided by & 40 pound spring.
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The M-44 device is driven into the ground and baited with a
scented tuft of wool or other animal hide. When the coyote tugs the
bait the M-44 is triggered, ejecting the cyanide capsule into the
animal's mouth.
The main advantages of the M-44 over coyote-getters are in
reduced danger from the top wad to humans and other non target species
of animals, and the reduced initial alarm of the coyote, resulting in
recovery of the animal close to the device.
The M-44 was banned in 1972 along with toxicants; however, an
experimental program has been initiated In Montana and other States
to gather infozrmation for the possible registration of sodium cyanide
by the Environmental Protection Agency.

Fences
Fencing of pastures with "coyote-proof" fences has been tried
for many years in some areas. %e results of the fencing in lox)teeth
ing sheep have varied, but generally, fences have been unsuccessful
because of many limitations (Robinson, 1962). A "coyote-proof" fenc#
usually consists of an above ground section (too high for a coyote to
jump) and a below ground portion (to prevent digging under).
Limitations to this type of fencing In&ludet

(l) high cost of

materials and installation for large acreages, (2) weak spots along
water courses and ravines, and the ability of many coyotes to enter
a pasture by climbing over the fence.
Jardine (1911) learned, in a one year study, that the advantages
of a "coyote-proof" fencing system Included* (l) Increase in the
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percentage of lambs saved, (2) decrease In the eunount of labor
necessary to manage the sheep, (3) better condition of both ewes and
lambs at the end of the lambing season, and (4) a decrease in acreage
of range necessary to handle small flocks of sheep. Jardine also
noted that the cost of fencing and successfitlness depended upon
location and individual operation.

Coursing With Dogs

According to Robinson (1962), chasing coyotes with "running
hounds" of the greyhound, Russian wolfhound types has given striking
results in the past but is becoming increasingly less effective with
settlement of the country. Fences that accompaiv settlement are
barriers to horses or cars that may be used in following the dogs,
Robinson feels that this method is generally more of a sport than a
coyote control measure; however, some ranchers have had extraordinary
success In protecting their flocks using the large hunting dogs
(Mlssoulian, 1974).

CHAPTER V

COYOTE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH

In the past, predator management programs have primarily been
limited to attempts to curtail economic losses to domestic livestock,
disease suppression, or reducing predator populations In an effort to
enhance othw wildlife populations. Following Executive Order 116^^3
and general dissatisfaction with the results of control operations,
the Department of the Interior Increased and redirected Its research
efforts. In 1974, an additional $800,000 was reprogrammed Into
predator damage research, for a total of $1,100,000. With 20 Fish
and Wildlife Service personnel Involved In the research and contracts
at seven Universities In siqsport, the research program Is divided
Into three major areast (l) the Identification and measurement of
damage, (2) predator ecology and behavior, and (3) development of
means of reducing livestock losses (USDiI, 1974)*
Following are explanations of the major research areas together
with summaries of some of the Investigations to date. It should be
realized that these are by no means all of the research programs
being undertaken.

In addition to federal research, research Is

proceeding at many universities, and Investigations are also taking
place at the state level. In 1973» the first Issue of an unofficial
publication of the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, the

-47-
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Coyote Research Newsletter, listed 92 on-golng and planned Investiga
tions,

Itie second Issue, August 1974, details more than 26 coyote

research endeavors Initiated In the past year as well as more than
140 literature citations In regard to coyotes since 1970»

The news

letter was generated In the Interest of expediting contacts and
communications within the research community studying coyotes,
prédation ecology, depredation control, and coyote management.

Damage Assessment

Efforts at characterizing the degree and nature of livestock
losses are at the heart of the predator control controversy.
Intensity levels of coyote management operations are based, to a
large extent, on assessed or anticipated damage caused to stock. For
this reason It Is Imperative that accurate measvcrements of prédation
he made. Unfortunately, damage estimates In the past have often been
questionable. In the Vest, major problems have been, (l) failure to
locate livestock carcasses, (2) failure to accurately assess the
cause of stock mortality, (3) bias on the part of ranchers (eg., a
coyote Is seen scavenging on a disease killed animal, so a predator
kill Is reported), (4) deliberate Inflation of loss figures by
ranchers, field agents, or both, and (5) confusion regarding statement
of loss figures (eg., losses can be stated as a percentage of total
sheep lost to predators, a percentage of total lambs lost to
predators, or a percentage of prédation losses to total losses).
With regard to sources of loss figures, Balser(l974) lists six
available sources. These sources were also commented on by Cain et al.
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(1971)I and Leopold et al. (1964). Following are the more Important
sources of livestock loss data together with some of the problems
associated with using them: (l) United States Department of
Agriculture Statistical Reporting Service. This data consists of
total losses by states for ewes and lambs as reported ty question
naires. The SRS total loss figures do not assign causes but at leaist
set an upper limit on predator losses. The SRS figures may be too
low for lambs because of the lack of fetal birth rate counts (number
of lambs actually bom) for either range or shed lambing operations.
Rather, they are based on standing lamb counts or counts at the time
of tail docking, (2) Questionnaire surveys in Texas, Colorado,
Wyoming, and Montana reported in a review by Reynolds and Gustad
(1971)•

This data gave an overall estimate of 5*3 per cent average

predator loss to the sheep industry, (3) United States Forest Service.
Data consists of reports to the Forest Service by grazing permittees
on total losses, Inclullng prédation. Bias exists because losses are
; stated only for the summer grazing season and also because the Forest
Service counts only adult animals; females with young under six months
are counted as one animal unit, (4) Personal interviews by Nielson and
Curie (1970). The interview information from two studies revealed
that approximately 50 per cent of the ranchers reported less than
5 per cent predator losses, 25 per cent of the ranchers reported 5 to
10 per cent predator losses, and 25 per cent reported over 10 per cent
predator losses, (5) Division of Wildlife Services Records. These
records have information such as the magnitude of control efforts In
terms of dollars spent, total numbers of animals taken by control
operations, and In some cases, observations on sheep losses. Recent
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attempts Ty the Division to tabulate loss data to determine the number
of signed control agreements in relation to numbers of sheep operators
in each state, the acreages under control, the number of sheep and
calf loss complaints, or the number of confirmed and unconfirmed
sheep and calf losses have not met with success.

A problem has been

the slowness of ranchers in reporting losses. Delayed loss counts
cannot be verified.
Another source of loss data is surveys carried out by individual
organizations or States, Livestock organizations and maiqr other
groiqis frequently conduct loss surveys in order to keep abreast of the
prédation situation.
Because questionnaire and interview studies do not yield the
reliable data gained from biological field studies, current Department
of the Interior research is orientated towards field Investigations
patterned after investigations by Davenport, Bowns, and Workman
(1973)*

In these field studies, attempts are being made to locate

- j and necropsy all dead animals to determine actual predator kills.
Proper Identification of livestock loss and accurate measurement of
loss are prerequisites to solution of the animal damage problem.
Four studies are now underway in the States of Haho, Wyoming,
Montana and New Mexico to measure livestock losses on 16 selected
herds of sheep by dally searches on foot, horseback, and 4-wheel
drive vehicles. All dead animals found are necropsled and loredator
losses are separated from other causes of mortality.
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Idaho
In the Idaho shed-lambing operations, nine bands of sheep
suffered a minimum confirmed predator loss of 1.1 per cent In 1973
and 1.6 per cent In 197^*

The maximum predator loss was 4.4 per cent

In 1973 and 4 per cent In 1974. The reason for the Increase in
minimum confirmed loss and decrease in maximum prédation loss is the
Increased intensity of search and experience of the crews which
reduced the unknown losses. The new result is no significant change
in losses between 1973 and 1974 in the Idaho studies (USDI, 1974).

Wyoming
Five bands of sheep have been tracked for 1.5 years. Ihe
results show a confirmed 1 per cent predator loss on the lamb crop
in 1973*

Total losses were $,6 p«r cent. i<amb losses from prédation

in the first part of 1974 were 2.1 per cent, while total losses were
14 per cent. No significant changes have occurred between 1973 and
1974.
Mortality-detecting telemetry equipment will be used in this
study which will enable researches to locate dead lambs within a few
hours of death wherever they are. This equipment should greatly re
duce the magnitude of unidentified losses reported in other studies.
Duplication of the Idaho and Wyoming studies are planned in 3 to
5 locations In the western United States (Knowlton, 1973)*

Montana
A study is currently underway, by contract with the University

of Montana, to determine sheep losses in the absence of ai^ predator
control*

The study, being conducted on the Bill Cook ranch near

Florence, in Western Montana, has resulted in the loss of

lambs

as of Dec. 3, 1974, from coyote prédation out of k77 total deaths
since April 1, 1974. This loss is from a lamb crop of 1300 lambs,
a 27 per cent losa to predators. No significant change in the rate of
prédation between 1973 and 1974 has occurred even without predator
control in 1974.

New Mexico
This is a comparable study to the one being carried out in
Montana although it is being monitored with telemetry. While this was
Intended to be a study without predator control, the ranches surround
ing the study area exert heavy control and definitely reduce losses on
the study herd. Results to date reveal that from a lamb crop of 339
lambs, there were 50 confirmed predator kills out of 130 deaths or
14.7 per cent of the flock was lost to prédation even with perimeter
predator control.
If all data from the above studies are grouped together, it
appears that predator losses are from 1 per cent to 4 per cent under
intensive predator control. Also, in general, about 20 per cent of
the ranchers may sustain heavy losses while the remaining 80 per cent
under an intensive control program have a loss range somewhere between
1 and 4 per cent. Without predator control, losses may run 15 to 25
per cent (Baiser, 1974)
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In a Utah study In 1972 sponsored ty Utah State University,
verified predator losses, as a percentage of total losses, on 10 herds
of sheep (on spring and summer range) ranged from 1.8 per cent to 40,3
per cent*

Losses expressed as a per cent of the total lamb crop ran

from .2 per cent to 4.1 per cent.
This study also attempted to evaluate factors affecting the
magnitude of losses. Five of the sheep herds were acconqpanied ty a
fulltime herder while the other five were untended.

The number of

sheep in each catagory were approximately equal.
The unherded group had a verified predator loss of 192 lambs or
71,4 per cent of the total.

The herded group had a verified loss of

77 lambs or 28.6 per cent of the total,

^he physical presence of the

herder and his dogs probably accounted for the difference in damage.
Other factors considered to reduce prédation were field agents,
bounty hunters, and trappers all of which removed a number of coyotes
(Davenport, Bowns, and Workman, 1972).
Future research will need to examine (l) measurement of extreme
losses compared to average loss to determine if there is a managable
characteristic or vulnerability in heavy loss situations, (2) extent
of calf losses, and (3) dajnage assessment on a broader range of damage
problems and to determine, on a percentage basis, the number of
ranchers suffering heavy, medium and light losses.

Predator Ecology and Behavior
Predator ecology is the study of the natural functions of
predator populations, the effects the environment inqposes on preda
tors, and the effects predators impart to the rest of the biota.
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In order to assess the effects of control programs on coyote
populations and range ecology, and In order to formulate effective
control programs, It is necessary to more fully understand the
coyote's ecologlc and biologic role In nature.
Although limited coyote research has gone on for many years,
comparatively little is known about the species at this time. The
natural Intelligence and eluslveness of the coyote, the vast expanses
of the coyote's range, and variety of environments within It have
caused difficulty In sampling coyote populations and handicapped
research efforts to date. Notwithstanding, the majority of predator
control oriented research at this time Is aimed at coyote ecology.
Although determining the coyote's role In the natural scheme of things
Is probably the most difficult problem In animal damage research, it
Is extremely important.

Natural functions of coyote populations must

be fully understood before their role as predators on domestic sheep
and cattle will become clear. In addition, economic evaluation of
prédation is impossible without a thorough understanding of the
biology of prédation (Craighead, 1951)•
Inquiries Into coyote ecology are numerous and varied t however,
certain areas are currently receiving proportionately more interest.
The more Important fields of investigation follow.

Coyote Population Dynamics

Determination of coyote population densities Is an extremely
difficult but necessary task for researchers. Knowledge of densities
should be an Integral part of formulating control strategy for a given
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locale (eg., type of control, level of control needed, and duration-of
control). Without prior knowledge of coyote densities, evaluations of
control efforts are both difficult and Incomplete.
Methods of determining coyote density In the past have been
crude and lacking In reliability. These methods have relied mainly on
trapcatch ratios (Robinson, 1961) (Llnhart and Robinson, 1972),
although other techniques have been used such as track counts, scat
counts, e]JLcl$^d_^iogll^ig^^

and aerial surveys.

In an effort to obtain more precise measurements of carnivore
densities and population trends, an annual Index of carnivore abun
dance was Initiated In 1972 (Llnhart and Knowlton, 1973)*

Through

the cooperative efforts of the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife,
the Bureau of Land Management, the United States Forest Service,
State Fish and Game Agencies, and some academic Institutions, a scent
post indexing technique was utilized on some 328 census lines located
throughout 17 States west of the 9^th meridian. The main reason for
the survey was to gain information on coyote density although other
carnivores were also included.
Indices of relative carnivore abundance were obtained for each
survey line ty totaling the number of operable scent post stations
visited ty each species for a succession of five night periods.

The

total number of "scent station nights" was derived ly subtracting
from a maximum of 250 station nights (50 stations x 5 nights) all
those that were Inoperable because of human Interference, weather, or
animal Interference. The index was then calculated as follows*

Index

=

Total Number of Animal Visits
—-———X 1,000
Tbtal Number of Operable Station Nights

56
In 1973» the same techniques were used to determine abundance
Indices although five new survey lines were added. Results of the
1972 and 1973 Indice surveys follows

State

% Change

1222

1222

91

85

-7

Oregon

128

97

-25

California

128

138

+8

Nevada

92

91

-2

Idaho

85

68

-20

Montana

61

73

+20

Utah

76

50

-35

Wyoming

51

62

+22

Colorado

110

136

+24

New Mexico

80

122

+54

North Dakota

49

47

-4

South Dakota

66

111

+68

Arizona

152

149

-2

Nebraska

102

237

+131

Kansas

159

147

-8

Oklahoma

143

207

+4k

Texas

135

148

+10

Washington

Following comparisons of the 1972 and 1973 indices, there were
indications that coyote numbers had declined in the inter-mountain:
area but had increased in maiy of the States east of the Continental
Divide, These changes were considered within the range of normal
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fluctuations attributed to food base.
In 197^» the same survey methods were used as before; however,
the number or census lines exceeded 425»

Data from the 197^ survey

are currently being tabulated.
It should be noted that these indices express only relative
abundance, there being no way to relate them with actual coyote
numbers at this time.
The above study will be extremely useful in determining long
term coyote population trends and in evaluating the effectiveness of
lethal controls, although it will not assign absolute numbers to
coyotes.

A current computer study^ suggests a reasonable degree of

reliability in the use of scent station indices in assessing coyote
abundance.
At this time, ideas of absolute densities for coyotes are
frequently limited to educated estimates.

A breeding population of

1.5 per square mile and a postwhelping population of 2.0 per square
mile in a six county area of Kansas was established by Gier (1968).
Clark (1972), estimated postwhelping season densities in Curley
Valley, Utah at one coyote per 2 to 4 square miles. According to
Knowlton (1972), coyote densities appear to range as high as 5 or 6
per square mile under extremely favorable conditions, with 0.5 to 1.0
per square mile seemingly realistic over a large portion of their
range.

^Statistical Properties of the Scent-Station Method After
Indexing Coyote Abundance. United States Department of the Interior,
Contract 14-16-0008-1123.
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In 1972, Connolly, (1972) formulated a coyote population model
using data from Knowlton (1972) and Gier (1968), Following oomputw
analysis his conclusions were* (l) coyote populations have a high
rate of natural annual turnover, (2) coyote populations can persist
or even increase when subjected to high levels of control mortality
due to compensatory adjustments of reproductive and natural loss
rates, (3)

the compensatory adjustments, the amount of reduction in

the natural loss rates may he the more critical parameter determining
the ability of the population to withstand control efforts, (4) in
terms of coyote population dynamics, birth reduction may give more
effective control than killing coyotes, and (5) all these population
parameters fluctuate over time. It would be useful to know which
parameters are most sensitive to changes in the natural food base
as well as alternative food supplies (livestock).
The Department of the Interior will initiate further density
studies in the future. In addition, other aspects of coyote popula
tion dynamics will be investigated.

Current interests are In

documenting reproduction and dispersal and mortality patterns among
unexplolted coyote populations. The latter studies will serve as a
basis for interpreting the effects and reactions within populations
exposed to various degrees of. e^qploltatlon. Of particular interest
are the causes of mortality among coyotes within populations fre#
from human interference (Knowlton, 1973).
Coyote reproductive biology is of interest for several reasons.
Researchers would like further Information about natural population
increase as well as the factors that affect this increase. %ls
information would be useful in conjunction with recent studies using
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antifertility drugs in reducing coyote reproduction. Studies ty
Kennelly (1972) and Llnhart et al. (1968) have added to the available
Information, but more study Is needed.

Predator-Prey Relationships
Another area of Importance Is predator-prey relations.
Predator-prey Interactions need investigation from the standpoint of
density. Studies have been started to determine the relationships
between coyote density and prey blomass. The converse of the
predator-prey Interaction, namely, the Influence of predators on prey
populations, must also be taken into account. Studies by Knowlton

(1968), Baiser et al. (I968), Clark (1972),and Wagner and Stoddarf
(1972) suggest that, under some conditions, predators may signifi
cantly affect prey population parameters.
With respect to domestic sheep, it has long been assumed that
coyote prédation is in direct proportion to coyote numbers and
density. Further research is needed to clarify this question;
howevw, some preliminary work suggests that this might not be the
case (Baiser, 1973)*

Coyote Behavior

According to the Department of the Interior(USDI, 197^)* coyote
behavior studies will include the sensory capabilities used by coyotes
in seeking and selecting prey as well as the mechanisms used to
regulate intraspeciflc Interactions.

While a major part of these

efforts may appear very basic, they will serve as cornerstones for
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utilizing behavioral technology as a means of resolving managementconflicts• Defensive behavioral mechanisms employed Iqr prey species
will also receive attention*

Depredations Control Methods
Historically, Federal predator control research has concentrated
on the development of effective lethal chemicals and devices. Since
Executive Order 11643, however, the Department of the Interior has
redirected research efforts to provide increased attisntion to develop
ment of nonlethal control methods. Although the emphasis is now on
nonlethal tools, work is going on to find selective lethal techniques
as well. In this regard, scientists are experimenting with a cyanide
collar to be worn by sheep. If this concept woxdcs, it will not only
be almost totally selective for coyotes, but it will also affect only
those coyotes killing sheep. This would be an ideal control method.
Generally speaking, research into nonlethal control methods is
still in the planning or preliminary laboratory stages.

Much more

work will be needed before most of these methods will be evaluated
and tested on coyotes in the field. Following is a summary of the
nonlethal coyote management methods presently under study.

Aniifertillty Agents

The search for nonlethal coyote control methods pronqpted invest
igation of antifertillty agents to limit reproduction. ^ suppressing
reproduction in a population, to a level below that of natural mortal
ity, a population may be controlled with greater certainty than bgg
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increasing one or more mortality factors (Baiser, 1964), To this eni,
an investigation was started ly the Denver Wildlife Research
Laboratory*

Researchers chose the following criteria for a good

antlfertllity agent for field uses

(l) preferably, the agent should

be effective in a single oral dose on either or both sexes at one or
more vulnerable stages of reproduction; (2) there should be a wide
margin of safety between theeffective and lethal dose to preclude the
chance of aiy animal picking vç a lethal dose; (3) It should be
relatively stable, inexpensive, and effective in doses under 500
milligrams for practical field application; (4) it should be
relatively tasteless, odorless, or capable of being masked so it will
not cause aversion to baits. Acceptance without side effects, such as
nausea, is Important for the same reason; and (5) the sterility effect
should be temporary, for one breeding season or one year, depending on
the animals breeding habits.

Suppression of reproduction can then be

applied or withdrawn at will without permanently affecting either the
target species or the other species that might be exposed.
Following review of the literature and consultation with drug
coiqpanies, the drug diethylstllbestrol was chosen as best meeting the
above requirements.
In penned tests with diethylstllbestrol (often referred to as
stllbestrol), pregnancy was terminated in six coyotes, using a 100
milligram oral dose of the drug. Llnhart and Enders (1964) obtained
similar results using a 50 milligram dose of stllbestrol for captive
red foxes. In both of the above tests the time of application of the
drug was critical. It was found that stllbestrol could be veiy
effective during or just after mating in suppressing reproduction. A
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limiting factor in the wild, however, is that reproduction is spread
over a period of time among individuals so application of an agent
effective at short, critical periods, such as ovum transport,
fertilization, or implantation would mean that only a small proportion
of females would be affected at any one time»
In field tests during 1963 in New Mexico, tallow drop baits
with 100 milligram doses of stilbestrol were used to test the drug's
effects on coyote reproduction. Results showed that only 20 per cent
coyote reproductive success occurred in treated areas (Baiser, 196'4-).
Further field tests were made until 196?, using stilbestrol and
Incorporating a longterm marker, demethylchlortetracycline (DMGT).
DMCT Induces a golden yellow fluorescence in the bones and teeth of
coyotes eating the bait for at least 5 months (Linhaxt and Kennelly,
1967). This procedure permitted investigators to obtain both treated
(marked) and untreated (unmarked) samples from the same population
and eliminated differences in reproductive success resulting from
density-dependent or ecological factors.
Results of this particular study were inconclusive. Reproduc
tive success was only 20 per cent in one treated area; however, in
other treated areas reproductive success was comparable to the
untreated control areas. It was recommended that development of other
antlfertillty agents besides stilbestrol be undertaken because
stilbestrol exerts its primary effects between ovulation and implanta
tion, a relatively short period of time.

Therefore, to be effective,

this compound must be eaten by females during this limited period
(Linhart et al., I968). Results in this study might have been better
had better methods of bait placement been used. Rodents and birds

63
removed large nximlsers of the tallow baits In some test areas.
Results of the above tests with stllbestrol indicated that wild
coyote populations can be successfully treated.

Whether or not this

would occur to a large extent under a wide variety of field
conditions is not known.
Recent developments in England indicate that certain alkylating
agents, such as isoproi^l methane may be effective in causing male
sterility for a sufficient period of time when given a single oral
dose. Tests have been planned.
Another antifertilil^ drug, mestranol, has been tested on dogs
with promising results. Mestranol interfered with embryo survival
in female beagles when administered either 6 or 21 days after the
female first accepted the male.

The long term effects or the side

effects of the drug were not determined. Mestremol could possibly
be applied in suppressing reproduction in other canines Including the
coyote (Kennelly, 1969)*

Aversives
Research into aversive agents to be used in depredations control
programs has been going on for a number of years. Although aversives
hold promise as an excellent nonlethal technique for protecting sheep
from coyote attacks, they are still in the pen testing stages*
A most promising study was begun in 1973 by Gustavson and
Garcia (197^) who attempted to initiate a conditioned response to the
taste of food In captured coyotes. It was reasoned that if coyotes
became sick following a meal of meat, they might be conditioned to

avoid this type of meat in the futxire. If this approach worked in
pen tests it could conceivably work in field operations*
The aversive agent used in this study was lithium chloride. It
probably holds the most promise for eventual field use. Results
showed that coyotes learned to avoid lamb meat tainted with lithium
and, after a period, live lambs.
One of the drawbacks of aversive agents, such as lithium, will
probably be that coyotes will have to be reconditioned periodically
(test coyotes eventually started to eat the type of meat that had
originally made them sick).
Other aversive agents have been experimented with in recent
years including bad smells such as skunk odor or mountain lion urine,
and devices such as electric collars.
Penned tests have been completed using two candidate aversive
agents, DRC-6O8I (a bitter conq>ound) and DRC-5593 (a. compound causing
an intense burning sensation). Other emetus or nausea producing
compounds are also being tested (USDI, 197^)*

Attractants
The role of pheromones as a possible attractant for coyotes is
being investigated. Tësts on trap lines in Wyoming have raised some
interesting questions about coyote responses to a group of five fatty
acids that make up a pheromone conqplex in a number of mammals.

A

recent field test with pheromones revealed that old "snaggle-toothed"
coyotes were being taken rather than young inexperienced animals.
Apparently these older animals had been avoiding local control efforts

65
for years (Reed, 1973).

Tranquilizers

The need for capturing adult coyotes in good condition for
experimental use led to the development of a tranquilizer trap-tab to
eliminate or reduce injuries incurred In steel trapping. Other types
of tranquilizers are being studied at present.
In one study, the drug "diazepam" has shown utility In reducing
injuries to carnivores caught in steel traps and in preventing their
escape (Baiser, I965). In this instance, the drug was enclosed in a
chewable cloth capsule and wired to the trap jaw.

The dose for

coyotes was 1 gram of "diazepam" per capsule. Following capture, it
was found that most coyotes chewed the cloth capsule and ingested
enough of the drug to produce the symptoms of ataxia, salivation, lack
of attention, drowsiness, and reduction or absence of biting. Seven
teen coyotes were captured and only one failed to Ingest the tab in.
field tests. This study showed that tabs also were effective, in some
degree in tranquil1zing various numbers of foxes, badgers, skunks, and
bobcats.
Advantages of using tranquilizers In conjunction with steel
traps or other programs are, (l) taking animals unharmed for various
ptcrposes, (2) enabling easy release of recalcitrant animals and
reducing foot damage, and (3) helping prevent the escapement of
trapped animals and making the steel trap more human#.
Direct application of tranquilizers in the form of Injected
drop baits are of interest. Coyotes tranqulllsEod in this manner

would be more unwary and would be easier to take by other control
methods.

Mechanical Devices
Ongoing experiments using mechanical control devices Include
various forms of "coyote-proof" fencing and electric fencing.
Contractual studies are underway at Colorado State University to
determine which of the highly developed senses of the coyote are
most subject to chemical or mechanical means of Inducing prey
avoidance.

CHAPTER VI

THE SHEEP nmUSlRY

In order to more fully understand the controversy over animal
damage control it is necessary to gain insight into the sheep raising
inlustxy, their operations, and their problems.
Sheep raising has long been an important part of the nation's
livestock industry. Its advance into the western part ofthe country
coincided with expansion of the frontier.
Sheep thrive under a wide variety of physical and biological
conditions. They graze well on terrain too rough, high, and arid to
be habitable by other domesticated animals, and can make use of plant
species which might be too sparse or unpalatable to other species of
livestock. Sheep are among the most efficient domesticated ruminantb
animals in the conversion of ro<ughages, and they blend well either as
a supplementary farm enterprise or a highly specialized enttoprlse
(Goodsell and Belfleld, 1972).

Tirpes of Operations
Sheep-producing units can be classed into three mjor types of
operations I farm flocks, stock farms, or sheep ranches.
Farm flocks are extremely varied as to size, but generally
average about 40 head per unit.

The farm flock is basically a
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supplementary type of enterprise used in conjunction with agriculture
or other stock raising. Farm flocks make up nearly 95 percent of all
U. S. producing units, but produce less than a third of the lambs and
wool.
Stock farms generally average around 500 sheep per unit, few
exceeding 1000 head. This group produces about one-fifth of U. S.
sheep.
Sheep ranches are found mainly in the Western and Southwestenr;
United States.

They vary in size, and may range from 1,500 to 10,000

head per ranch. This type of operation produces more than half the
lambs and wool in the U. S.

Decline of the Sheep Industry
From 1890 to 19*^0 sheep numbers in the U. S. fluctuated between
ko and 50 million head.

A big crash in sheep numbers occurred

between the years 19^0 and 19^5 when the sheep population declined
from 40 million to approximately 26 million.

The decline in numbers

of sheep has continued to the present time, and it is estimated that
there are now only 16,500,000 head in the U. S., concentrated mainly
in the West (Appendix 4).

Reasons for the Decline
The sheep industry's decline can be attributed to a variety of
factors, including (l) labor shortages, (2) low prices for lamb and
wool, (3) prédation, and (4) competition from foreign markets.

All

of the above factors have played a part in the decline of the sheep
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industxyi however, the biggest single contributing factor was labor
shortages (Wilson, 1973) (Gain et al, 1971) (Evanson, 1967)#
The labor shortages which had to be faced by the sheep Industry
came as a result of the manpower requirements of World War II. "Oie
shortages were a crucial blow because they were mainly in the form of
trained herders. The Importance of these herders to range sheep
operations cannot be overestimated.
Sheep have been called the most dependent, defenseless, and
instinctively deficient of all domestic animals. Thousands of ymun
of inbreeding to obtain high quality meat and wool has made the sheegp
relatively helpless, requiring human assistance throughout their
lives.
At lambing time the ewe has an absolute need for human assist
ance. Losses on ewe flocks average five percent, most deaths result
ing from lambing complications (Evanson, I967). Numerous lamb losses
also occur at this time from such causes as Inclement weather,
prédation, disease, abandonment, and malnutrition.
On the range, adult sheep are subject to the above causes of
mortally and maiy more.

Drownings, over-eiqposure to the sim,

paraBltes, Improper diet', and poisonous plants are all responsible
for numerous deaths each year.
Much sheep mortality on the open range is preventable providing
the animals have adequate human supervision. It was only natural
that sheep numbers declined, and losses from all causes increased,
following the herder shortages.
The sheep industry never fully recovered following the labor
shortages and drop in stock numbers. Additionally, further economic
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woes beset the wool growers In the form of Increasing losses to
coyotes, low wool and lamb prices, reduction in grazing quotas on
Federal lands, increased operational costs, and competition from
foreign markets. All of these factors were responsible for driving a
considerable number of marginally successful sheep operators out of
the business.
At approximately the same time as the initial decline in sheep
numbers occurred (mid 19^8) coyote populations were low throughout:
much of the West.

These low numbers were attributed, mainly, to

the initial success of the chemical control programs which had started
in the early 1940s. However, the coyote populations may have been at
cyclic lows during this period.
Either because of normal population fluctuations, or reduced
effectiveness of control programs, coyote numbers increased during
the late igkOs and throughout the 1950s (this Is based purely on
observations by field agents and ranchers—there being no way to
assign an absolute number to coyotes at that time). At this same tim*
complaints of increased losses of sheep to coyote prédation began to
be heard.

These complaints have persisted to this day, and now most

sheepmen claim that the coyote is the single most detrimental factor
to the industry.

A frequently quoted figure from the wool growers

is that the coyotes cost them $20,000,000 a year. Whether this figure
is inflated or not, the coyote is a considerable financial burden to
the industry which operates on a narrow profit margin. The narrow
profit instability of the wool producing Industry led to government
assistance in the farm subsidies.
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Subsidies to the Sheep Industry

The Federal Government subsidizes the sheep Industry In three
ways; (l) wool tariffs, (2) wool Incentive payments, and (3) predator
control *

Wool Tariffs

American sheep raisers do not produce enough wool to satisfy
domestic needs. In an attempt to reduce the dependence of American
consumers upon Imported wool, protective tariffs have been enacted.
The tariff on woven woolen fabrics valued at over $2.00 per pound Is
37*5 cents per pound plus 38 percent ad valorem. This adds $1,135 to
the price of each pound of this fabric. According to Evanson (1967),
the tariff has not been successful because wool production declined In
spite of the higher prices received by wool growers, while Inqports of
raw wool and woolen fabrics continued to rise.

Wool Incentive Payments

Price supports (called wool Incentive payments), tied to the
current market prices, are authorized by the National Wool Act of
195^» which declares that, "It Is the policy of Congress, as a measure
of national security and In promotion of the general economic
welfare, to encourage the annual domestic production of 300 million
pounds of shorn wool."

When wool prices are low as In 1971» 19*4^

cents per pound. Incentive payments are high. For Instance, In 1971
subsidies of 271.1 percent were paid to taring the price of wool up to
the 72 cents per pound level set by the Wool Act.
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Funds for incentive payments are derived from tariffs on wool.
Up to 70 percent of the accumulated total of funds from wool tariffs
may "be used for incentive payments.

Predator Control
Predator control activities are carried out mainly to protect
the western sheep industry,

A good part of the funding for the

program is derived from public monies ty Congressional appropriations.
In 1971, for example, the Federal Govenunent spent $1,700,000 for
coyote control in the western United States. The 1973 and 197^
budgets are approximately 4 million dollars.

Montana's Sheep Industry
Montana's sheep industry is similar to the western sheep
industry in general.

It is comprised largely of range sheep opera

tions east of the Continental Divide with feurm flocks located mainly
west of the Divide.
The sheep industry in Montana has followed the same pattern of
decline as the industry as a whole. A 1973 survey, carried out by the
Montana State Livestock Depeirtment, showed that the number of sheep in
19 of Montana's largest sheep producing counties (representing 70
percent of the sheep population) during the past 12 years has steadily
declined (Sayler, 1973)»

Montana Crop and Livestock Reporting Service

figures show that sheep and lambs on Montana farms and ranches
January 1, 197^ totalled 79^,000 head—a decline of 17 percent from
last year.

The inventory of total sheep and lambs on a national basis
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on January 1, 1974 was 16,500,000 head—a decline of 7 percent from
1973*

Wool production figures for Montana and the United States as a

whole have also declined from earlier levels. Montana wool growers
sheared a total of 7*7 million pounds of wool, grease basis, In 1973—
down 10 percent from a year earlier*

Nationally, the 1973 production

of wool was 153«9 million pounds, grease basis—down 8 percent from
1972.
A survey carried out In December of 1973 Iv the îtontana Wool
Growers Association, which represents 90 percent of the State's 2,700
sheep men, showed a 58.5 percent Increase in predator losses from 1972
to 1973» and estimated that maiy ranchers have lost from 20 to 40 per
cent of their total lamb crop. Prédation is the number one problem to
Montana sheep producers according to this survey (Montana Wool Grow
ers, 1973).
The frequency of prédation problems seems to fall within three
general categories in Montana. First, chronic problems occur from
year to year in certain areas during April through October with high
lamb losses. Calf losses occur from March through May. Secondly,
seasonal problems occur each year with sporadic prédation at times
reaching chronic proportions.

However, the total amount and duration

of intensity fluctuate greatly from month to month and year to year.
Thirdly, irregular prédation problems exist when livestock producora
have little or no consistent annual prédation problems. Then live
stock producers may experience losses of chronic proportions (Montana
Department of Livestock, 1974).
It is uncertain what the futtire holds for the sheep raising
industry in Montana or the United States.

Whether it will continue to
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follow the pattern of decline which has already been set or whether
it will regain some of the earlier prominence it once enjoyed is not
known. Whichever course the sheep ranching business takes will depend
upon the economic factors influencing any business, use of proper
operational techniques, and the effectiveness of coyote management
programs.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION

The predator control controversy has raised issues that demand
resolution and which reflect the public's growing environmental
awareness and the need for sound planning in wildlife management
programs.
Predator control activities were started when the concept of
"environmental impact" was still in the future.

As time passed, the

public's attitudes changed and mass reduction of predator populations,
by whatever means, became less and less popular.

Even so, the

country's livestock producers still had to make a living and to them
predator control was a necessity.

The Wyoming eagle poisoning

Incident focused public attention on the government's control activi
ties and increased the outcry at animal damage control.

The ban on

toxicants which followed had the same effect on the nation's stockmen
who began to claim increased losses and call for more effective
control efforts.

This is a large part of the predator control contro

versy; one of the hottest issues to come along in years.
Solutions to the conflict will not come easily and time will be
required before research can provide information to fill the gaps in
knowledge which now exist.

It was one of the shortcomings of the

government's control program that little attempt was made to accurate
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ly assess either the public's attitude on control or the effectiveness
of the program Itself. As a result, the Federal Government Is now
Involved in a crash research program which will eventually produce
solutions to the conflicts.

These solutions will lie somewhere be

tween the extreme viewpoints of no predator control and vastly
Increased control programs using all available weapons.
Most conservationists agree with the livestock producers that
some control is needed In the West; however, the questions of super
vision, cost, and methods still have to be settled. The major Issues
Involved in the present controversy were outlined In Chapter Ttro.
Recent research has provided insight into some ofthe problems brought
out in Chapter Tito and I believe that some of the points in contention
can be resolved at this time*

Administration of Control Programs
Legislation currently before Congress, if passed, will shift the
burden of predator control to the States. Whether the States can
accomplish any more than the Federal Government accomplished is not
known at this time; however, a large degree of the success will depend
upon which State agency will have control responsibility. There has
been heated debate in Congress over this very point,

H. R. J8

specifically designates the State agency for wildlife management to
administer the State's Federally funded predator control program*
H. R. ^759 leaves the question of administration up to the State,
requiring only that such a program be "reviewed" ty the wildlife
agency, H. R. 11266 provides for the program to be jointly approved
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ty the appointed State agency and the aigency for wildlife management,
if the latter is not the one designated to administer the program,
I believe that the responsibility for a predator control program
should fall to the State agency for wildlife management, In Montana,
this would be the State Pish and Game Department.

This agency is in

the best position to oversee control activities to prevent damage to
the numerous animal communities connected with control of predators»
While the Department of Livestock has been responsible for carrying
out Montana's coyote control program in the past, it is ny opinion
that this agency may be too closely associated with the State's live
stock interests.
A close association of this type could lead to conflicts in
control program administration.

Conflicts must be avoided in predator

control programs wherever possible because the programs have such
far-reaching consequences. For this reason, I feel that the State
Department of Fish and Game should administer animal damage control
programs with direct input by» and in coordination with, the Livestock
Department.

Toxicant Use In Predator Control
The issue of toxicant use in predator control has received more
attention than it deserves from both stockmen and environmental groups
alike. Ranchers have tended to look upon poisons as the main line of
defense against the coyote, while environmental groups have rallied
to the theory that the only good poison is a banned poison.

I feel

that the available evidence suggests that neither of the above
positions is correct.
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In iny opinion, the ban on toxicant use was enacted rather
hastily with little thought to its impact on the livestock industry
or Federal control programs.

It is interesting to note that the

Leopold Committee found nothing wrong with careful use of Compound
1080, while the Cain Committee, made up of many of the same people,
recommended that 1080 be banned along with other poisons. Certainly
there were dangers associated with poison use. Threats to nontarget
species of animals, and especially rare animals, should have been
avoided at all costs but were not because of careless administration
of toxicant programs.

In addition, there was a lack of evaluation

of either the effectiveness or the impact of toxicants.

Wholesale

1080 programs and broadcast programs using strychnine baits should
never have been allowed.

Toxicant use should have been thoroughly

planned, supervised, and used only in critical situations*
Even though ranchers have come to look v^n poisons as the best
means of controlling coyotes, evidence supporting this belief Is lack
ing. At this time it is impossible to separate the effectiveness of
toxicants from that of other controls. Toxicants have played a role
in pireventing or reducing livestock losses but it is difficult to
determine how great the role was. In addition, no generalizations
can be made at this time about coyotô numbers and sheep losses in
relation to the ban on toxicants other than that we have probably
suffered a considerable net reduction in control efficiency by
removing toxicants. Efficiency was lost because more costly
mechanical methods had to be substituted for poisons.
Further research is needed concerning the effects of poisons
but I feel that we will find that limited use of selective toxicants
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may be necessary to achieve control in some situations. Even so, use
of toxicants should be prohibited in most situations where adequate
control can be provided through mechanical means.

If a situation

warrants use of poisons, the M-44 device should be used.

This device

provides some selectivity, eliminates the danger of secondary
poisoning, and is relatively humane because of its quick action.

The Economics of Predator Control
Economic considerations as related to the interactions between
livestock, coyotes, and predator control are complex.

As in other

areas of the predator control controversy, the scarcity of accurate
data has contributed to the overall confusion.
The major point which has to be resolved regarding economics of
control is how much damage is inflicted upon the livestock industry by
predators. The sheepmen are hardest hit ajid claims frequently
approach $20,000,000 per year. Evanson (1967), using a method he
developed, has estimated that $4-10 million would be more realistic.
Whichever is the case, there is no doubt that coyotes and other
predators inflict a heavy financial burden on the sheepmen each year.
How great the losses actually are is not known but they must be
determined through more accurate means of damage assessment. It will
be somie time before current studies will be able to provide accurate
insight into the sheep loss situation. Investigations will probably
show that loss figures are Inflated considerably in some areas and
that control expenditures are not always justified in terms of the
value of the resource being protected.
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There is not enough information available at this time to draw
any final conclusions atout the coyotefe effect on the economy of the
sheep industry, although a tentative conclusion might be that
prédation has been responsible for a further decline in an already
declining industry.

Effectiveness of Control Programs

Information needed to evaluate the effectiveness of control
efforts is limited. Control effectiveness is gauged primarily by the
reduction or prevention of livestock losses and by reduction of
coyote numbers.

In the first case, livestock producers are firmly

convinced that control programs have had little effect on losses and
even less effect since the toxicant bem. The plain fact is that there
are no means presently available to determine the overall effects of
control measures on livestock losses. All control methods have
probably helped to prevent and reduce losses to an extent but just
how great the extent has been has not been determined. Current
studies are attempting to find some of the answers but evidence is
oftentimes conflicting. For Instance, in the University of Montana
study near Florence, Montana, losses on a herd of sheep have not
significantly increased from 1973 even though control was in effectt
in 1973 and is not in 197^* Since losses in both years are approxi
mately equal, it can be argued that controls have had no effect in
this case. In a companion study, being carried out in New Mexico, a
herd of sheep is being monitored in aji area with no control in effect.
Losses have not been as heavy as in Montana and a tentative conclusion
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Is that controls In the surrounding areas have helped reduce losses
on the study herd.
Available statistics show a gradual increase in losses from
prédation over the past 20 years. The statistics do not show how
these losses are distributed, however. There is evidence that only a
relatively small number of ranchers are suffering losses which can be
considered heavy while the majority is suffering light to moderate
losses. A loss pattern such as this suggests that, in some areas,
control has been effective while in others it has not. The reasons
for the differences in effectiveness must be determined through
research. Since the types of controls used have been essential]^ the
same in all areas, outside factors obviously play a much greater
part in control effectiveness than has been suspected. Current
beliefs are that coyote density, livestock density, and the natural
food supply all are directly related to prédation on livestock.
The other means for evaluating the effectiveness of coyote
control programs is determining whether they have reduced coyote
numbers. Here the picture is clearer. Disregarding normal cyclic
fluctuations, it appears that coyote populations have remained
relatively constant throughout the past 20 years. In other words,
coyote controls have not been responsible for any longterm population
reductions. It is probable that coyote populations have not been
successfully regulated because they have made compensatory adjustments
in both reproductive success and in survival of the young. For this
reason, a different approach to coyote control is indicated. Future
control programs and research should concentrate largely on
nonlethal means for regulating predator populations.
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Following review of the literature on predator control, I am of
the opinion that a high degree of effectiveness could be achieved
through directing controls at the specific animal causing damage to
livestock. Extension programs have been successful in the East and
have concentrated on the predator killing stock.

It is possible that

similar systems would be of benefit in the West.

The success of such

systems would depend largely on the training given the ranchers.
In conclusion, definite changes are called for in the present
animal damage control program. Past controls have not been effective
in reducing coyote numbers and have been wasteful in terms of animals
taken smd in funds which have been expended.

Improved control

effectiveness will come through selective measures used in programs
planned for specific areas, seasons, and range conditions. This type
of planning has not taken place in the past.

PRIVATE INTERESTS VERSUS PUBLIC INTERESTS
a COYOTE CONTROL
In addition to questions of a scientific nature, the predator
control controversy has raised certain moral issues. These issues
involve both funding of predator control programs and. management of
public lands.
Predator control programs are partially funded with public
monies derived from Federal and State appropriations.

This practice

is objectionable to many people, myself included. The public should
not be required to fund programs for the benefit of a private
industry. While a stable livestock industry is probably in the best
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Interests of the national economy, I believe that the coyote should
be considered a risk of livestock production and, therefore, all
control programs should be funded by the user interest. The livestock
industry should be assisted through Federal and State research and
technical skills only.
The other moral issue which has been raised concerns the
management of the public's wildlife (predators) on public lands. A
great many people find the coyote and other large predators to be of
aesthetic value and object to the killing o^these predators on public
lauds. It is nqr opinion that while the public should not have to
fund predator control operations, it does have other obligations
towards the livestock industry. There is a definite need for predator
control activities at this time; therefore, control programs on public
lands should be accepted as one of the trade-offs which have to be
made. The general public should be made aware that management of
coyote populations through control activities has not affected the
coyote's abilities to maintain adequate population levels.
The above questions are complex and not easily answered. Like
most moral issues, they will probably never be settled to everyone's
satisfaction.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY

%e controvert surrounding control of larger carnivores, and
particularly the coyote, presents one of the most difficult problems
In the field of wildlife management.
Prédation by larger carnivores has concerned man for a long
timet however, no predator control problem has stirred up more
controversy than the one Involving predators that prey on domestic
livestock.
For the past thirty years an emotional confrontation developed
between livestock producers and segments of the general public who
might be collectively labeled conservationists, environmentalists, or
preservationists. The major points in contention are (l) administra
tion of control programs, (2) use of toxicants for predator control,

(3) the effectiveness of control progrsuas, (4) the economics involved
In predator control, and (5) public interests versus private interests
in coyote control. Resolution of these areas of conflict will be
difficult, but a necessary task for researchers*

To date, efforts

have been handicapped by the scarcity of field data and by the
emotional quality of the debate.
The Federal Government entered into control activities in 1915
when Congress authorized $125,000 for the Bureau of Biological Survey
to conduct animal damage control programs. Then in 1931» Congress
—84"—
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passed the Animal Damage Control Act which directs the Secretary of
the Interior to conduct campaigns for the control of animals
injurious to agriculture, livestock, or people. The present Federal
predator control program is carried out pursuant to this Act. The
program is conducted in cooperation with the States and local
cooperators, and is funded through Congressional appropriations aM
contributions from the State aM local cooperators.
The Federal predator control program is aimed primarily at
protecting western range sheep from attacks by coyotes, although
nonpredatory bird and mammal controls are also practiced»
In the 1940s and 1950s, public attitudes changed concerning
predator control programs.

Most urban people found that coyotes and

other large predators have aesthetic value and they objected to the
killing of the predators for the benefit of the private livestock
industry. One particular incident served to focus more public atten
tion on predator control activities than any other. It was discovered
that 22 bald and golden eagles had accidentally been poisoned from
consuming baits meant for coyotes. Further investigation showed that
nontarget birds and mammals were quite often the victims of coyote
control programs and public protests reacher their peak at this time.
As a result, an advisory board was formed to evaluate the Federal
control program and present its findings to the 3ecretairy of the
Interior. Their report, commonly referred to as the Leopold Report,
was published in 1964. Among other things, the report stated that
the present controls considerably exceeded the amount needed and did
not take into account the full spectrum of human needs and values.
Few changes came about as a result of the Leopold Report.
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Because of continued public dissatisfaction, another committee was
formed in 1971 to reevaluate control programs.

The final report,

called the Cain Report, was published in 1971. It found numerous
failures in predator control activities and made 15 recommendations
for needed changes.

In response to one of the recommendations,

President Nixon issued Executive Order 116^4-3 which banned the use of
all toxicants for predator control on Federal lands. This order was
immediately followed by Pesticides Notice 72-2 from the Environmental
Protection Agency,

The notice removed the registration of all

toxicants used for predator control and prohibited their Interstate
commerce.
The ban on toxicants brought loud protests from the livestock
industry, who looked upon poisons as the main defense against
predators. Following the ban in 1972, livestock producers complained
of greatly increased losses to predators and waged a battle for the
reinstatement of poisons.

Their arguments were countered by various

environmental groups who stated that livestock losses had not
increased and that effective control could be achieved without the use
of poisons.
If efforts to evaluate the effects of the toxicant ban, the
Department of the Interior initiated a program of intensified predator
control.

This program Incorporated only mechanical controls, relying

mainly on trapping and shooting predators from aircraft. It was
concluded that adequate control could be achieved without poisons, but
this would be more expensive.

Stockmen have vigorously disagreed

with this conclusion.
At the present time, the Federal Government is Involved in
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research that concentrates on nonlethal control methods, daunage
assessment techniques, and predator ecology and biology. Large gaps
of information exist in these areas.

It will probably be some time

before current field studies will be able to provide answers to the
existing questions; however, progress is being made.
In response to public protests concerning the past inadequacies
of predator control programs, legislation is currently before Congress,
Briefly, this legislation, if passed, would transfer the responsibility
for control programs to the States, make Executive Order 116^3 into
law, repeal the Animal Damage Control Act of 1931, and authorize the
Secretary of the Interior to assist the States in control activities*
While the new legislation may help to resolve some of the
existing problems connected with predator control programs, some of
the issues will never be totally settled. However, with continued
research and public education the opposing sides in the controversy
can be brought closer together.

Any final solutions will have to be

compromises between the extreme viewpoints of vastly increased control
programs, using all available methods and no predator control at all.
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APPENDIX 1
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
EXECUTIVE ORDER

ENVIRONMENTAL SAt^GUARDS ON ACTIVITIES FOR ANIMAL DAMAGE
CONTKOL ON FEDERAL LANDS
gy virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States and in furtherance of the purposes and policies of the
National Environmental Policy Act of I969 (42 USC 4321 et seq.) and
the Endangered Species Conservation Act of I969 (I6 USC 668aa), it
is ordered as follows1
Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the Federal government
to (1) restrict the use on Federal lands of chemical toxicants for the
purpose of killing predatory mammals or birds; (2) restrict the use on
such lands of chemical toxicants which cause ar^ secondary poisoning
effects for the purpose of killing other mammals, birds, or reptiles;
(3) restrict the use of both such types of toxicants in any Federal
programs of mammal or bird damage control that may be authorized ty
law. All such mammal or bird damage control programs shall be con
ducted in a manner which contributes to the maintenance of environ
mental quality, and to the conservation and protection, to the greatest
degree possible, of the Nation's wildlife resources, including
predatory animals.
Section 2. Definitions. As used in the order, the term: (a)
'federal lands" means all real property owned by or leased to the
Federal Government, excluding (l) lands administered by the Secretary
of the Interior pursuant to his trust responsibilities for Indian
affairs, and (2) real property located in metropolitan areas.
(b) "Agencies" means the departments, agencies, and establish
ments of the executive branch of the Federal Government.
(c) "Chemical toxicant" means any chemical substance which,
when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed, or when applied to or injected
into the body, in relatively small amounts, ty its chemical action
may cause significant bodily malfunction. Injury, illness, or death,
to animals or man.
(d) "Predatory mammal or bird" means any mammal or bird which
habitually preys upon other animals or birds.
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(e) "Secondary poisoning effects" means the result attributable
to a chemical toxicant which, after being ingested, inhaled, or
absorbed, or then applied to or ingested into a mammal, bird, or
reptile, is retained in its tissue or otherwise retained in such a
manner and quantity that the tissue itself or retaining part if there
after ingested by man, mammal, bird, or reptile, produces the effects
set forth in paragraph (c) of this section.
(f) "Field use** means use on lands not in, or immediately
adjacent to, occupied buildings.
Section 3. Restrictions on Use of Chemical Toxicants.
(a) Heads of agencies shadl take such action as
prevent on arqr Federal lands under their jurisdiction,
Federal prograjn of mammal or bird damage control under
tion;
(1) the field use of aigr chemical toxicant
of killing a predatory mammal or bird;

is necessary to
or in any
their jurisdic
for the purpose
or

(2) the field use of any chemical toxicamt which causes
ar^ secondary poisoning effect for the purpose of
killing mammals, birds, or reptiles.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section, the head of any agency may authorize the emergency use on
Federal lands under his jurisdiction of a chemical toxicant for the
purpose of killing predatory mammals or birds, or of a chemical
toxicant which causes a secondary poisoning effect for the purpose of
killing other mammals, birds, or reptiles, but only if in each specific
case he makes a written finding, following consultation with the
Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, ajad Health, Education and
Welfare, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
that any emergency exists that cannot be dealt with by means which do
not involve use of chemical toxicants, and that such use is essential*

(1) to the protection of the health or safety of human life;
(2) to the preservation of one or more wildlife species
threatened with extinction, or likely within the foreseeable
future to become so threatened; or

(3) to the prevention of substantial irretrievable damage to
nationally significant natural resources.
Section 4. Rules for Implementation of Order. Heads of agencies
shall issue such rules or regulations as may be necessary and approp
riate to carry out the provisions and policy of this order.
Richard Nixon
THE WHITE HOUSE
February 8, 1972
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APPENDIX 2
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
PESTICIDES OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250
March 9, 1972
PR Notice 72-2
PESTICIDES REGULATION DIVISION
NOTICE TO MAMJFACnJRERS, FORMULATORS, DISTRIBUTORS
AND REGISTRANTSOF ECONOMIC POISONS
Attention: Person Responsible for Federal Registration of
Economic Poisons
Suspension of Registration for Certain Products
Containing Sodium Fluoroacetate (1080),
Strychnine and Sodium Cyanide
I.
Last spring, this Agency made a public commitment to review
the status of registrations for strychnine, cyanide, and sodium
fluoroacetate (1080), for use in prairie and rangeland areas for
the purpose of predator and rodent control. This commitment grew
out of grave concern surfaced by the reported deaths of some 20
eagles killed by the misuse of thallium sulfate.^
This same concern caused the Secretary of the Interior to
initiate a through review of the government's federal predator
control program.

An advisory committee was appointed under the

chairmanship of Dr. Stanley Cain, Director, Institute for
Environmental Quality and Professor of Botany and Conservation

^This concern predates last summer. In I963 the Secretary of
Interior appointed an Advisory Board on Wildlife and Game Management
chaired by Dr. Leopold of the University of California.
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at the University of Michigan,

The report of that advisory

committee was released earlier this month.
Aside from this Agency's review and the Gain findings, a
detailed petition has been submitted to this Agency by several
distinguished conservation groups urging that the registrations of
these compounds be cancelled and suspended immediately. That
petition invoked the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C, 1 135» Section 2z(2)9c) which requires
that an economic poison contain "directions for use which are
necessary and if complied with, adequate to prevent injury to
living man and other vertebrate animals. ,

and Section 4c

which allows the Administrator to initiate cancellation proceed
ings by ordering immediate suspension "when he finds that such
action is necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public."

2

Based on this Agency's review of the registrations of sodium
cyanide, strychnine, and 1080 in light of available evidence, I am
persuaded that their registrations for predator uses should be
suspended and cancelled.

Sponsors of the petition were* %e Natural Resources Defense
Council, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends, of the Earth, The Humane
Society of the United States, National Audobon Society, Inc.,
New York Zoological Society, the Sierra Club, and the National
Parks and Conservation Association.

II
The Cain group has dealt at length with the effects of the
use of strychnine, cyanide, and 1080 for predator control. The
report points out the extreme toxicity of these compounds, their
non-selectivity, and their potential impact on the environment
which "is increased by secondary hazard, accumulation in the animal,
and combined characteristics of chemical stability and solubility
in water."

This report reconfirms the findings of the Leopold Report

(see^, supra) that the predator control program took a heavy
environmental toll.
Cyanide, strychnine, and 1080 are among the most toxic
chemicals known to man. They act quickly, spreading through an
entire animal crippling the central nervous system. These poisons
are toxic not only to their targets but other animals and wildlife.
All of these poisons have a similar pattern of use as unattended
baits and are spread over vast areas of open prairie.
In the case of strychnine use against badgers, coyotes, and
foxes, a tablet containing the poison is placed inside a one-inch
ball or cube of bait material such as meat, lard or tallow. These
baits are left along animal trails or near non-game carcasses.
While instructions caution the user to cover the baits over with
chips or brush to avoid ingestion by non-target animals, the Gain

9J
Report has suggested the Inadequacy of such directions.^
The pattern for cyanide use differs little in pertinent
respects. An explosive gun, a "coyote-getter," charged with
cyanide is baited and driven into the ground. Hie gun is left
unattended along the trail or range and is triggered when an
animal pulls at the bait.

In the case of 1080, carcasses of

dead animals are laced with the substance and strewn to attract
the predator.
Indiscriminate baiting over wide unpoliced areas poses two
obvious and recognized threats to non-target animals that share
the ranges as a natural habitat. The unsupervised bait is
itself a potential killer of non-target range species. The threat,
however, is compounded by the extremely high toxicity of these
poisons, which can transform the predator carcass into a potential
lethal killer of prairie animal life.
While the effects of prairie baiting are, for the most part,
not documented, the Cain group has suggested the present evidence
may well understate thtô true damage.

It is appropriate to take

^According to the Cain Committee, if toxicants were consis
tently applied under field conditions with meticulous case, it is
possible undesirable side-effects might be avoided. Draft at 131.
However, the Committee concludes, "It appears that the necessary
high standards are not likely to be attained." (Draft at II5)
The Committee found no reliably precise data is available showing
the degree of predator control achieved or the possible loss that
might ensue without ajiy program.

administrative notice of the fact that isolated accidents
Involving wildlife are not apt to be reported.

Isolated, even

if routine and numerous, instances of secondary animal poisoning
would not have

the visability of a wildlife "kill," nor is there

apt to be an observer present as in the case of human mishap. The
administrative process need not be blind to these realities. This
Agency's Pesticides Registration Division has, moreover, reports
of cases of alleged secondary and accidental poisoning, and
recently range-use of 1080 has been suspected of killing birds.
Including some of our rare species.
Measured against these obvious threats to wildlife are only
ill-defined and speculative benefits.

The Cain Committee has

noted the absence of amy meaningful information on the efficacy
of poison baiting, especially in relation to the economic loss
caused by predators to the sheep industry.

At least one state,

Nevada, has estimated that the cost of predator control was ten
times the value of livestock and poultry lost to predators.
This absence of any meaningful data of benefits derived from
the use of these highly dangerous poisons which pose a marked
potential threat to the environment renders these registrations
suspect. It is now settled that the burden of proof rests on the
poison. The report, moreover, specifically cites the greater
selectivity of ground shooting, denning, and trapping, and the
Department of the Interior is embarking on a study to determine
other methods of control.

Here, where it is known that alternative

methods of control exist, the registrations must be seriously
questioned,
III.
In deciding whether or not these considerations justify
suspension, it must be recognized that the concept of suspension
is one that must evolve, and existing verbal tests are not readily
translated into a decisive cue for action. The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, and the judicial and administrative
constructions of it to date set forth only word formulas that
establish a ereneral attitude on suspension questions. Each
situation must be scrutinized not only for what is involved, but
also for what is not involved.
Turning to the verbal tests by which we must measure the
use of these poisons, FIPRA provides that the Administrator of
EPA "may, when he finds that such action is necessary to prevent
an imminent hazard to the public, by order, suspend the registra
tion of an economic poison immediately."

"Public" is not to be

viewed restrictively, and includes fish and wildlife, as has
recently and forcefully been noted in an opinion of federal
court. See EPF v. Ruckelshaus. 439 F. 2d 58^, at 597*

Nor does

"imminent" mean that we are on the "brink" and that the harm

will occur tommorrow or has been documented.

It is sufficient

that reasonable men can conclude that action taken today will
with reasonable certainty lead to a loss in the future and that
loss will be irremediable and uncorrectable by subsequent action,
and that the apparent benefits from usine a chemical, pending the
complete statutory review process, are outweisrhed by the possible
harm of use during the period,^

Or, as the matter was put in the

Agency's DDT policy statement of March 18, 1971, the type, extent
probability and duration of such injury will be measured in light
of the positive benefits accruing from use of the economic poison,
for example, in human or animal disease control or food production.
Bearing these principles in mind, I am persuaded that a
definite hazard exists*

While the mere toxcity of poisons does

not, under FIFRA, render them a hazard, their decree of toxicity

^An'imminent hazard' may be declared at any point in a
chain of events which may ultimately result in harm to the
public. It is not necessary that the final anticipated injury
actually have occurred prior to the determination that an
'imminent hazard' exists." Reasons Underlying the Registra
tion Decisions Concerning Products Containing DDT. 2.4.5.-T.
Aldrln and Dleldrln. at 6.
^The cancellation proceeding involving the possibility of
both a scientific advisory committee and public hearing consumes
at least one year. In actual fact, these proceedings have
generally taken considerably more than a year.
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and pattern of use may well do so.

The unattended and unsuper

vised use of poisons over large areas of land, by definition,
poses a hazard to non-target species.

The fact that label

instructions contain directions for placing the baits at times
and in areas least likely to be populated by non-target species
and for policing them, affords slight, if any comfort. This
Agency has on prior occasions taken into account a "commonly
recognized practice" of use (see In Re Hari Kari Lindane, I.F, & R,
(Docket #6), and has noted that the likelihood of directions
being followed may affect their adequacy (see In Re King Paint.
2 ERG 1819 (1970))I In Re Stearns. 2 ERG 1364 (1970).
The hazards from the pattern of use for these chemicals is
not remote or off in the distant future. The prairies and ranges
are populated by numerous animals, some of which are becoming rare*
At jeopardy are potentially endangered species. Each death to
that population is an irremediable loss and renders such species
closer to extinction.
No apparent circumstances exist to counterbalance this
distinct hazard and suggest that the possibility of irremediable
loss is outweighed by the harm that might occur from their
nonavailability during a period of suspension.

The situation

might well be different were the removal of these poisons from the
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market likely to affect human health or the supply of a staple
foodstuff; or were there no apparent alternatives available, the
balance might be differently struck.

This, however, is not true,

I am hereby affixing findinscs of fact and an order suspending
and cancelling these chemicals for use in predator control.

Max. 9 1972

William D. Ruckelshaus
Administrator

FINDINGS OF FACT

Cyanide

1«

Two products in the form of shells containing sodium

cyanide are currently registered for explosive devices designed
to kill coyotes that may prey on sheep.

The device is simply a

cyanide charge placed in a baited cylinder and driven into the
ground. When the animal pulls at the bait the charge explodes
into its mouth.

Only one of the shell products is registered for

use by the general public.

The Division of Wildlife Services of

the Department of the Interior has probably been the largest user
of such devices,
2. Sodium cyanide is a water-soluble white-solid which
reacts with acids to form hydrogen cyanide gas. This chemical
is among the most toxic and rapidly acting of all known poisons,
3»

Persons overcome by gas either die very rapidly from

respiratory failure or recover completely within a relatively
short time.
4, Ingestion or inhalation of a very low dose (as little a
300 micrograms per litre of air) may rapidly result in death,
5,

There is no true effective antidote,

6, Recent data show four incidents Involving cyanide com
pounds in fiscal year 1970 in three of which human beings were
Injured by the discharge of cyanide guns placed in fields. Only
quick thinking on the part of all three victims in seeking
Immediate medical aid prevented axïy loss of life,
7, There is evidence that dogs have been subjected to
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polsonln? ty cyanide (used as outlined above) which is highly
toxic to all wildlife and domestic animals*
Strychnine
8, Currently at least six products containing strychnine
in tablet and technical powder form are registered for use in
baits against coyotes and wolves.
9»

The technical powder form is for reformulation and

repackaging, and is for use only by professional pest control
operators and government agencies*
10*

The tablets are available on the open market*

11*

Strychnine is an extremely bitter-tasting white crystal*

12*

It is a complex, naturally occurring, organic compound

which would probably bind to soil readily and decompose over a
period of time, although information on the persistence of
strychnine and its effect on the environment is somewhat limited*
13. Strychnine is highly toxic to humans and animals, with
30 mg* considered as a threat to the life of an adult man. Death
has, however, been reported with as little as 5 to 10 mgs., and
animal life may be acutely poisoned by ingestion of small amounts,
14. Strychnine acts by interfering with normal neural processes,
causing exaggerated muscle contraction and violent convulsion. Death
in a rather gruesome form due to respiratory failure soon follows
unless the seizures are controlled.
15*

There is no true effective antidote.
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1080 (Sodium Fluoracetate)

16, Four products containing 1080 are currently registered for
use as mammalian predacides.
17, Use is restricted to areas west of the 100th meridian, and
then only by Division of Wildlife Services personnel, or under their
direct supervision,
18, 1080 is a white powder, soluble in water, very stable, and
thus very persistent in ground water,
19«

1080 is highly toxic to all species. The dangerous dose

for man is 0,5 - 2 mg/kg. The chemical acts rapidly upon the central
nervous and cardiovascular systems with cardiac effects. Effect
is usually too quick to permit treatment, and antidotes are relatively
valueless,
20,

According to one authority, prior to 1963 there were 13

proven fatal cases, five suspected deaths, and six non-fatal cases of
1080 poisoning in man, although it is not clear to what extent
predator control materials were in^licated,
21, %ere is evidence that a certain number of non-target
animals are being adversely affected by 1080 products, particularly,
in the case of carrion eating birds and mammals, by secondary
poisoning. It is not clear, however, how various animal populations
are being affected, although 1080 is thought to have contributed to
the death of at least one California condor, an endangered species.
Benefits
22,

There is no reliable data as to the amount of predator

control achieved by the use of these poisons,
23•

There is no reliable data as to the loss of sheep that
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might occur without a predator control program using these poisons,
or of the real effect of such losses on the general economic health
of the sheep industry.

Certain data that are presently available

indicate predator losses may in fact be of such a low magnitude as
to be a minor part of total losses.

The Cain Report suggests that

among other reasons for the decline of the sheep industry may be
competition from synthetic fibers and from lot-fed livestock.
24. For the maintenance of predator control programs, especially
in the sheep industry, effective non-chemical alternatives exist,
including' denning, shooting and trapping, methods that have long
been available and effective, thouph more costly than poisons.
25»

The Federal Government has committed itself to a research

program for methodsof controlling predators other than poisons.
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CONCLUSION

The predator use of the foregoing chemicals presents an
imminent hazard such as to warrant their suspension pursuant
to § 4(c) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act,

ORDER
In accordance with the attached opinion and findings, it
is hereby ordered that the registration for all products con
taining sodium fluoroacetate (1080), sodium dyanide or strychnine
for use against mammalian predators be cancelled and suspended
immediately.
Registrations for those products bearing directions as
listed above are hereby suspended and the products may not be
legally shipped in Interstate commerce until labeled to block
out instructions for predator use.

Mar 9 1972

William D. Ruckelshaus
Administrator
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APPENDIX 3
MONTANA ANIMAL DAMAGE CONTROL BUDGET
Fiscal Year 1974
July 1, 1973 — June 30, 1974
Supervisory and Clerical Expenditures
Salary State Supervisor, 2 District Supervisors
2 clerks

$ 76,592

Hazardous Pay

1,000

Retirement, Insurance Premium, and Health Plan

6,848

Per Diem and Travel

6,200

GSA Rental Vehicles

3,800

Gas and Oil for Government Vehicles (Service-owned)

1,600

Repairsfor Government Vehicles & Equipment (Service-Owned)

800

Federal Cost Reimbursable Accounts 2^o

4,500

Telephone

1,600

Express

200

Utilities

210

Postage

1,400

Supplies

3,000

Major Equipment (2 new trucks—Includes trade-in)

4,000

Administration Expense, Department of Livestock

58,700
$170,450

FUNDS AVAILABLE
Montana Department of Livestock
Montana Fish & Game Department
Bureau of Sport Fisheries & wildlife
Counties

$165,821
40,000
157,250
88,OOP
$451,071
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MONTANA ANIMAL DAMAGE CONTROL BUDGET
Fiscal Year 1974
July 1» 1973 — June 30, 1974
District Field Assistant Expenditures
Salary for 8 man-years © $7,200
Salary for 10 man-years @ $7,500
Salary for 1 man-year @ $7,800

$ 57,600
75,000
7,800

Salary for temporary 9/l2 man-years @ $7,200 (inc. Soc, Sec.) 5,715
Retirement, Insurance Premium, and Health Plan

12,500

Mileage and Per Diem (306,000 miles)

40,920

Horse Allowance

69O

Snow Traveler Allowance

200

GSA Rental, Pickup

1,800

Gas and Oil for Government Vehicles used by DFA's

7,500

Repairs for Government Vehicles used by DFA's

2,800

Telephone

2,000

Express

300

Warehouse

8I6

Supplies
Airplane, 2,600 hours § $16, $20, and $23 per hour
Contingency

4,500
57,200
3,280

$280,621
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APPENDIX 4
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Emphasis on Livestock
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1974.
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